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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The only parties to the appeal are:
Plaintiff Jose M. Gonzalez, and
Defendant Russell Sorensen Construction.
Other defendants and third-party defendants in the proceeding below who are not
involved in the appeal are:
Orchard Vista, LLC,
R. M. Rees Construction, dba Design Stone Creations,
PacifiCorp, dba Rocky Mountain Power, and
John Clayton Construction.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
I.

11
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST SORENSEN
A.
B.

II.

B.

III.

Plaintiffs direct negligence claims are not subject to "retained
control" principles, which apply only to claims of vicarious liability 11
The trial court correctly found issues of fact regarding Sorensen's
breach of duty under Restatement § 384
12

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
A.

11

Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen created the dangerous
condition
Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen took reasonable steps to
protect invitees from the dangerous condition once it existed

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT SORENSEN HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS

CONCLUSION

i J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

25
25

28
33

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997)
13
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
32
Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997 (Utah 1996)
12
Branum v. Petro-Hunt Corp., No. 4:09-CV-035, 2010 WL 1977963 (D.N.D. Mar. 15, 2010)... 21
Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 2002 UT App 412, 61 P.3d 287
13
Casaday v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2010 UT App 82, 232 P.3d 1075
32
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963)
2
Cooper v. Nelson, 211 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000)
22
Eischeidv. Dover Constr., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 448 (N.D.Iowa 2003)
22
Franklin v. OSCA, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 812 (Ark. 1992)
23
Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, 232 P.3d 1059
24
Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628
27
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263
13, 15, 25, 27
Harsch v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 781, 910 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
17
Hillabrandv. Drypers Corp., No. 9-02-37, 2002 WL 31260045 (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 10, 2002)22
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996)
30
Kesslerv. Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, 16P.3d 1225
15, 16, 18,22
Konicekv. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1990)
23
Lloyd G. Oliphant & Sons Paint v. Logan, 12 So.3d 614 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
23
Mack v. Utah State Dep't. of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, 221 P.3d 194
32
Maganav. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143
8, 11, 12
Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 2011 UT App 66,
P.3d
16, 18
Rapoza v. Willocks Construction Corp., No. 22052, 2004 WL 27460 (Haw. Jan. 2, 2004)
23
Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
32
Smithey v. Stueve Constr. Co., No. 04-4067, 2007 WL 172511, (D.S.D. Jan. 18, 2007)
21
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
2
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322
11, 12, 17, 20, 24, 25, 26
Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966)
17
Trujillo v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752
20
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947
2
U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010)
2
Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. hers, 2005 UT App 519, 128 P.3d 74
1
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996)
30
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966
32
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103

1
1

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Other Authorities
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

(3d ed. 2002)
62 AM.JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 10
Baicker-McKee, et al., Federal Civil Rules Handbook § 8(a)
L. Lehr, 2 PREMISES LIABILITY 3d § 39:7
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 333-339
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 341
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 341A
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343-343A
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427
Richard L. Ferrell III, EMERGING TRENDS IN PREMISES

1217

2
22
32
22
18
18
14
9,14, 17, 27
1, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 25, 33
11
24
11, 24
24
24

LIABILITY LAW: OHIO'S LATEST
MODIFICATION CONTINUES TO CHIP AWAY AT BEDROCK PRINCIPLES, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV.

1121,1141 (1995)
W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 510 (1984)
Rules
U.R.Civ.P. 8

14
12
1

iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). Prior
to transfer, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A3-102(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Issue 1:

Did the trial court correctly rule that issues of fact exist as to
Gonzalez's negligence claims against Russell Sorensen under the
principles summarized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 384?

Standard of review: The denial of a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. Utah Dept. of Tramp, v. hers, 2005 UT App 519, ^ 9, 128 P.3d 74.
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the parties' briefing on
summary judgment (R. 842, R. 1029), and at oral argument (R. 2219 and Exh. 2 hereto
(7/21/10 Tr.)).1
Issue 2:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that Russell
Sorensen was sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's negligence
claim?

Standard of review: The Utah Supreme Court has not expressly identified
the standard of review of a trial court's determination of fair notice under U.R.Civ.P.
8(a), particularly when such determination occurs mid-litigation. The court has applied
an abuse of discretion standard regarding the pleading of affirmative defenses under
U.R.Civ.P. 8(c), which must be pled in "short and plain terms." See Cheney v. Rucker,

1

Both parties have cited to the July 21, 2010, hearing transcript. See, e.g., Brief of
Appellant, p. 5 (citing R. 2219). However, it appears that the reporter may have
inadvertently filed only the first page of the transcript. See R. 2219. For the Court's
convenience, a full copy of the transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing evidence at trial allegedly inconsistent with defendant's answer).
Appellee Gonzalez submits that the correct standard under Rule 8(a) is also abuse
of discretion, the standard applied to the identical Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). 5
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1217 (3d
ed. 2002) (under Rule 8(a), "what is the proper length and level of clarity for a pleading
cannot be defined with any great precision and is largely a matter that is left for the
discretion of the trial court, which will be reversed by the court of appeals only if that
discretion is abused"); U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163,
1167 (10th Cir. 2010), and cases cited; see also Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 54, U 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 ("Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially
similar' to the federal rules.").
Preservation: Sorensen did not preserve this issue, as it was not raised
below until its reply memorandum. State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003-04
(Utah Ct.App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a):
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in
the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This is a claim for personal injuries arising when the plaintiff, Jose M. Gonzalez,
came into contact with a live electrical wire while installing soffit. Gonzalez filed an
initial complaint on September 26, 2008 (R. 1), and an amended complaint on January
22, 2009. (R. 126.)
After the close of discovery, including 14 liability depositions (R. 390, 393, 397,
405, 409, 414, 501, 513, 558, 561, 581, 614), defendant Russell Sorensen filed a motion
for summary judgment as to Gonzalez's claims against it. (R. 759.) Gonzalez filed an
opposing memorandum (R. 825), and Sorensen filed a reply memorandum (R. 1029).
The trial court held oral argument on July 21, 2010 (R. 1564), and on July 30,
2010, issued a memorandum decision denying Sorensen's motion for summary judgment.
(R. 1585, attached hereto as Exh. 1.) Sorensen timely petitioned for interlocutory review,
which this Court granted.

2

Third-party defendant John Clayton also filed an opposition to Sorensen's motion for
summary judgment. (R. 769.) Sorensen filed a motion to strike Clayton's opposition (R.
1009), and a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Clayton for having filed the opposition,
and also for opposing the motion to strike. (R. 1411.) Clayton filed a motion to intervene
as an immune party (R. 1426), which Sorensen opposed as well. (R. 1522.) The trial
court denied Sorensen's Rule 11 motion and granted the motion to intervene (R. 1832),
mooting Sorensen's motion to strike Clayton's opposition. Gonzalez adopted the factual
allegations in Clayton's opposition. (R. 2219 (Exh. 2), p. 23.)

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Statement of Facts
On June 22, 2007, plaintiff and appellee Jose M. Gonzalez was injured when he
came into contact with high-voltage power lines at a construction site in Midvale, Utah.
(R.3-4.)
At the time of the incident, Gonzalez was an employee of John Clayton
Construction ("Clayton"), a subcontractor hired to perform siding, soffit and fascia on
Building No. 4. (R. 855-856; R. 956.) (Soffit is "the underside of a part or member of a
building (as of an overhang or staircase), especially the intrados of an arch." Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987).)
Appellant and defendant Russell Sorensen Construction ("Sorensen") was the
general contractor for the development of the Property and for the Project. (R. 3 f 13; R.
128 U 14; R. 163 U 14; R. 654 % 1; R. 669 % 19; R. 919, 924.) Sorensen was on the job
every day, "at least every day, if—and multiple times during the day." (R. 296.) "As
general contractor [Sorensen] was responsible for general oversight and general
supervision of the overall construction of the Property." (R. 665 f 10.)
More than a year before Gonzalez's accident, PacifiCorp d/b/a Rocky Mountain
Power installed live, 7,200-volt overhead power lines in the area where Gonzalez was
later assigned to install soffit on Building No. 4. (R. 966-969 (lines at location by
February 2006).)

3

Throughout the litigation, the parties have defined "the Property" as "the property
located at 7590 Orchard Vista Court," and "the Project" as "the construction project
located at 7590 Orchard Vista Court." {E.g., R. 619, 1704.)
4
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Several other subcontractors also worked on Building No. 4, including plumbers,
framers, and roofers. (R. 927-931.) Defendant R.M. Rees Construction d/b/a Design
Stone Creations (hereinafter "Rees") was a subcontractor that did stucco work on the
building.

(R. 928-929; see also R. 110.)

The National Electric Safety Code ("NESC") specifies minimum horizontal and
vertical clearances for building walls and projections. Horizontal clearance must be at
least 7.5 feet. Vertical clearance from roofs and projections on the building must be at
least 12.5 feet. (R. 908; and citations therein.)
Gonzalez adduced evidence that Building No. 4, which contained units 12 & 13,
was constructed by Sorensen in violation of both clearance requirements, in that it was
constructed within 5.67 feet horizontally and within 8.5 feet vertically of the power line.
(R. 908; R. 981; see also R. 913.)
On the north side of Building No. 4, another subcontractor (Rees) set up
scaffolding to perform stucco work on the building. (R. 899; R. 998.) The scaffolding
was approximately 37 inches from the power lines. (R. 885; R. 907; see also R. 913; R.
916; R. 997-998.)
Sorensen knew that, in order to do work on the north side of Building No. 4,
workers would have to come within 10 feet or less of the live power lines. (R. 949.)
Sorensen knew that OSHA regulations prohibited workers from working within 10 feet of
high voltage electrical lines. (R. 923; see also R. 979-980; R. 986; R. 992.)
Sorensen knew that, if subcontractors would be working within 10 feet of the
power line, Rocky Mountain Power should be contacted. (R. 951-952.) Sorensen knew
5
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that Rocky Mountain Power could shut down the power lines, or that a contractor could
put a blanket or sleeve on the lines. (R. 945.) Sorensen did not contact Rocky Mountain
Power to let it know of any work on the north side of the building. (R. 951.)
Clayton had previously performed soffit and fascia work on the three other
buildings in the development.

(R. 957-958.) On Friday, June 22, 2007, Clayton's

foreman assigned Gonzalez to perform soffit work on the north side of Building No. 4.
(R. 862, 865.) Clayton had worked on building No. 4 for the previous two days. (R.
859-860.)
Clayton had used Rees' scaffolding on other occasions (R. 962), and Gonzalez
used the scaffolding already set up by Rees on the north side of Building No. 4. (R. 860861; 863-864.) Gonzalez climbed the scaffolding with his tools and four sections of
aluminum "J channel" material. (R. 717; R. 866.) As he moved the mold, it either
struck the energized line or came within sufficient proximity for electricity to arc from
the line to the J channel. Gonzalez received an electrical shock and fell 18 feet onto a
fence before hitting the ground. (R. 111-112; R. 882-884; R. 886; R. 898.)
Gonzalez's original complaint included, inter alia, the following allegations of
negligence by Sorensen:
*

*

*

23.
Defendants did not give Plaintiff any warning of the dangerous
power lines and their close proximity to the site where Plaintiffs work was to be
performed and/or affirmatively or constructively notified him that it was safe to
work on the scaffolding.

6
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24. Defendants failed to have the power turned off or protective barriers
installed around the power lines prior to allowing persons to work in close
proximity to the power lines.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all prior paragraphs, as though
restated and fully set forth herein.
27.

Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by, among other

things:
a.
Failing to properly exercise and maintain a place of
employment, which was free from recognized hazards that were likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to individuals working on the
Property;
*

*

*

c.
Failing to ensure that the development of the Property did not
encroach upon the electrical lines lining the Property, or that proper safety
measures regarding power lines were followed, including cutting off power
to the electrical lines, insulating the electrical lines and protecting the 10
foot safety circle;....

g.
Allowing people to work on improperly constructed
scaffolding and/or scaffolding erected less than 10 feet away from
operative, high-voltage electrical lines when they knew or should have
known that it was dangerous and unsafe to do so.
h.
Allowing individuals to work on the unsafe scaffolding and
within 10 feet of the power lines when they knew or should have known it
was unsafe to do so.
(Bold heading in original.) Similar allegations were contained in the January 2009
amended complaint. (R. 129-131, ^ 24-25, 28(a, c, h, i).)
Neither the original nor the amended complaint asserts a cause of action for
vicarious liability or retained control against Sorensen. (R. 1 and R. 126,passim.)

7
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Sorensen has taken the position in the litigation that Clayton's workers were
"trespassers" at the time of the accident, because they allegedly were not scheduled to do
soffit work that day (R. 1364), although Sorensen admits that it never told Clayton's
workers not to come to the site on Friday (June 22, 2007). (R. 859-860; see also R. 942;
R. 960-961.) Sorensen maintains that it had "shut down" the site to "all subcontractors"
on the day of the accident, and that Gonzalez did not have Sorensen's "consent" to be on
the premises. (R. 941-943; R. 655 \ 4; R. 656 f 7; R. 666-667 | 12; R. 686-687, pp. 8082:18-11; R. 688, pp. 86-88:20-14; and R. 1455-1457.) (It is undisputed, however, that
other subcontractors were doing work on other buildings that day. (R. 862.) In a
separate ruling, the trial court found that issues of fact exist as to whether Clayton had a
right to be working on the property at the time of the accident. (R. 1832).)
After the accident, Rocky Mountain Power relocated the power lines and sent a
bill to Sorensen for the cost of doing so. (R. 946-947; R. 1000.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied Sorensen's motion for summary judgment.
Sorensen's motion was based entirely upon a contention that Gonzalez cannot meet the
elements of a "retained control" claim, but that concept applies only to claims of
vicarious liability, which Gonzalez is not asserting against Sorensen. Under Magana v.
Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143, it would have been error for the trial
court to apply retained control principles to a claim of direct negligence.
The court properly concluded that Gonzalez's negligence claim is cognizable
because Utah would recognize the principles of liability summarized in the Restatement
8
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(Second) of Torts § 384. Under that section, a party who exercises control over premises
is subject to the same duties and defenses as an owner or possessor of the premises.
Defendant Sorensen admits that it exercised control over the entire job site, including the
specific area in which plaintiff Gonzalez was working at the time of the incident. Under
Utah law, workers such as Gonzalez are business invitees, and thus Sorensen owed
Gonzalez a duty not to create, or permit to remain, unreasonably dangerous conditions on
the site.
Sorensen's arguments against application of Section 384 are unavailing. Courts
and commentators widely recognize Section 384's adoption. Further, a number of courts
(including the Utah Supreme Court) have applied premises liability principles to general
contractors without expressly invoking Section 384.
Premises liability is not inconsistent with the general rule of non- liability for the
negligence of independent contractors; in fact, Sorensen admits that landowners are
subject to both the same general rule of non-liability and premises liability. Public policy
is not served by subjecting potentially distant or ignorant landowners to liability for
hazards created or tolerated by general contractors on site.
The duties applicable under Section 384 are only the basic reasonableness
requirements set forth in Restatement §§ 343-343A and surrounding sections. Contrary
to Sorensen's assertions, Gonzalez does not assert any duty by a general contractor to
supervise the method or manner of subcontractors' work, or to remedy "all known or
knowable" dangers, or with respect to risks inherent in the work itself.

The Utah

Supreme Court has properly concluded that no such duties should be imposed. But
9
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encountering live power lines unreasonably close to a work area has nothing to do with
the method or manner of installing soffit, and was not inherent in Gonzalez's work indeed, all subcontractors working in the area were exposed to the same hazard.
Applying premises liability principles to Gonzalez's claim, the trial court correctly
found issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Gonzalez adduced evidence that
Sorensen created the dangerous condition (erecting Building No. 4 too close to live
wires), and/or allowed the condition to remain unabated for more than a year, knowing
that workers were being exposed to it.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sorensen was
sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's claim. Although Sorensen accuses Gonzalez of
"recharacterizing" his claim from retained control to premises liability, there is no
retained control / vicarious liability claim in the complaint to begin with. The complaint
plainly states that Gonzalez's negligence claims are based upon "hazards . . . on the
Property," a classic premises liability claim. Although Sorensen argues that Gonzalez
should have alleged that Sorensen was an owner or possessor of the land, that would have
been erroneous: Under Section 384, the contractor is not transformed into an owner or
possessor, but rather is subject to the same duties and defenses as those persons.
The factual predicate of Gonzalez's claim has never varied: Over the ensuing two
years, 14 liability depositions have been taken (including that of Sorensen's principal), all
of which focused on the creation, maintenance, and knowledge of the hazardous
condition.

In construing the complaint and surrounding circumstances liberally, as

required by Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
10
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST SORENSEN.
A.

Plaintiffs direct negligence claims are not subject to "retained
control" principles, which apply only to claims of vicarious
liability.

The sole argument raised in defendant Sorensen's motion for summary judgment
was that plaintiff Gonzalez could not meet the elements of a claim under Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 409 and 414 (1965), the "retained control" doctrine. See Thompson
v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322. Gonzalez had no dispute with that proposition because he is not asserting a retained control claim.
The retained control doctrine only has application to claims of vicarious liability;
it is irrelevant to claims that a defendant was itself negligent. The Utah Supreme Court
reiterated this basic distinction in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215
P.3d 143. In Magana, the trial court and this Court both ruled that a worker's claims
against a general contractor were barred because the plaintiff could not show retained
control under Thompson, even though the plaintiff was also asserting a separate
negligence claim against the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed.
In a section titled "THE RETAINED CONTROL DOCTRINE DOES NOT
IMMUNIZE A CONTRACTOR FROM ITS OWN NEGLIGENT ACTS," the Supreme Court
held that this Court's affirmance of summary judgment was error "because it only
considered Magana's negligence claim under the retained control doctrine. The court
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failed to separately consider Magana's claim under the direct negligence theory that
Magana also advanced." Id. \ 36. The court explained:
The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct from a direct
negligence theory. Specifically, the retained control doctrine does not
apply when a plaintiff alleges that an employer's own actions were
negligent. Rather, the doctrine is limited to circumstances where the
plaintiff alleges that the employer of a contractor is liable for the
contractor's negligence because the employer retained sufficient control
over the contractor's actions to owe the plaintiff a duty of care regarding
the contractor's actions.
Id. f 37 (emphasis in original).
Reinforcing this distinction, the Magana court quoted from Thompson, 1999 UT
22, T| 13 ("[T]he employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.") (emphasis by
Supreme Court), and W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 510 (1984) ("Quite apart from any question of vicarious responsibility, the
employer may be liable for any negligence of his own in connection with the work to be
done."). Id. U 37 n. 30-31.
In this case, Gonzalez does not seek to hold Sorensen liable for the negligence of
another contractor. To the contrary: Gonzalez seeks to hold Sorensen liable for the
negligence of Sorensen. The retained control doctrine is thus immaterial to the claim.
B.

The trial court correctly found issues of fact regarding
Sorensen's breach of duty under Restatement § 384.

To prevail on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: duty,
breach, causation, and damages. Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999
(Utah 1996). The existence of a duty is generally a question of law, subject to subsidiary
12
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issues of fact. AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319-20
(Utah 1997).
In its motion for summary judgment, Sorensen essentially argued that it owed no
duty to Gonzalez because Sorensen did not control the manner or method of Gonzalez's
work, which would be one source of a duty recognized by the Restatement. In so
arguing, however, Sorensen's argument overlooked other sources of duty.
Premises liability is a form of negligence (in other words, one potential source of
duty). Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, Tj 4, 116 P.3d 263; Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 2002 UT
App 412, U 8, 61 P.3d 287. In Utah, workers who come to make alterations or repairs are
business invitees, and are thus owed certain duties while on the premises. Hale, 2005 UT
24, T| 33. See pp. 27-28, infra (summarizing duties recognized in Hale).
Claims for breach of such duties are most often brought against the "owner" or
"possessor" of the premises. In some instances, however, an owner or possessor permits
(or hires) someone else to take charge of the premises. In this case, owner Orchard Vista
hired general contractor Sorensen.

Sorensen acknowledges - indeed, affirmatively

declares - that it exercised full control over the entire site, including Building No. 4
where Gonzalez was working. See p. 8, supra (alleging that Clayton's workers were
trespassers because they were on the premises without Sorensen's permission).
When

a

general

contractor

exercises

control

over

premises,

courts

"overwhelmingly]" hold that it has the same duties, and the same defenses, as an owner
or possessor. See Richard L. Ferrell III, EMERGING TRENDS IN PREMISES LIABILITY
LAW: OHIO'S LATEST MODIFICATION CONTINUES TO CHIP AWAY AT BEDROCK
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PRINCIPLES,

21 O H I O N . U . L. REV. 1121, 1141 (1995) (". . . [T]he overwhelming weight

of authority across the country establishes] that an independent contractor is subject to
the same liabilities and clothed with the same rights as the landowner" [footnote
omitted].) Those duties and defenses are, in general, summarized in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 343-343A and surrounding sections. See, e.g., §§ 341 A, 343 (duty
owed to invitees), § 337 (duty owed to trespassers).
This principle is summarized in Restatement § 384, titled "Liability of Persons
Creating Artificial Conditions on Land on Behalf of Possessor for Physical Harm Caused
While Work Remains in Their Charge," which states:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the
same freedom from liability, as though he were the possessor of the land,
for physical harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the
dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in
his charge.4
Comment g explains when these duties arise and terminate:
The rule stated in this Section applies to determine the liability of one who
is entrusted by the possessor of land with the erection of a structure or the
creation of any other physical condition on the land, for only such bodily
harm as is caused while he remains in charge and control of the erection or
creation of the structure or condition. It does not apply to determine his
liability for harm caused after his charge and control of the work and his
privilege to be upon the land for the purpose of accomplishing it is
terminated in any manner. His charge and control is usually terminated by
the possessor's acceptance of the completed work, but it may be terminated
in a variety of other ways. For example, the possessor may, in pursuance or
4

A similar provision has been proposed in the Tentative Draft of Restatement (Third) of
Torts'. Phys. & Emot. Harm. Under the proposed draft, which has not yet been cited by
any courts, application of premises liability duties to contractors is expressed by the
latter's inclusion in the definition of "possessor." See § 49 (T.D. No. 6, 2009), Possessor
Of Land Defined, cmts a, e, and f.
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in violation of his contract, take the work out of the hands of the
independent contractor before it is completed or may order a servant to stop
the work entrusted to him. . . .
As noted above, there is no dispute that Russell Sorensen exercised control over
the entire premises, including the area in which Gonzalez was injured. The only issue,
therefore, is whether Utah would join the majority of jurisdictions in adopting § 384.
Sorensen correctly notes that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet done so. Notably,
however, the court has applied premises liability duties to general contractors. Kessler v.
Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, ffif 3, 9-10, 17, 16 P.3d 1225 (reversing orders granting
summary judgment and allowing attractive nuisance claims against both landowner and
contractor under Restatement § 339).
Sorensen argues that, because a contractor generally is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor, it would be inconsistent to allow a claim against
it under § 384. Sorensen's argument fails in several respects. First, to what negligence
by another contractor is Sorensen referring? It was Sorensen who allowed the building to
be constructed too close to the power lines, and who knew that various individuals would
have to work on the north side of Building No. 4.

If

Sorensen

feels

that

the

negligence of Gonzalez or Clayton, or one of its co-defendants, was exclusively the cause
of the accident, it certainly has not shown so as a matter of law, as required to obtain
summary judgment. See also Hale, supra (alleged comparative negligence by the worker
is for the jury, not a bar to suit).5

5

Under § 384, a subcontractor may also owe duties if it exercises control over a site. See
Cmt. d. How the Utah Supreme Court would deal with co- or joint liability under this
15
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Sorensen's argument also overlooks the fact that landowners, like contractors, are
not typically responsible for the negligence of independent contractors, yet premises
liability remains a separate, viable theory against such owners. (See Brief of Appellant,
p. 16, citing Hale; see also Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 2011 UT App
66, f 26, — P.3d — ("Generally, an employer is not liable to third persons for the torts of
an independent contractor. . . . 'One exception is that [the] owner of the premises . . .
[has] a nondelegable duty to keep the premises reasonably safe for business invitees'"
[citations omitted].).
Sorensen's argument would thus produce the ironic result that a distant or ignorant
landowner could be liable to worker-invitees for hazardous conditions on the property,
but not the general contractor who created the conditions or knowingly permitted them to
remain. No public purpose would be served by such a result. As the Utah Supreme
Court observed in Kessler, a contractor is in the best position to assess and remedy
dangerous conditions on site. 2000 UT 95, f 10 ("Given the rapidly changing nature of a
residential construction project, the homebuilder is in the best position to recognize
hazards and to protect children from the danger.").
Other arguments by Sorensen against the adoption of § 384 appear to
misapprehend the nature of the duty argued by Gonzalez and recognized by the trial
court. Accordingly, it seems useful to clarify what that duty does - and does not - entail:

section is not at issue in the appeal. In any event, Sorensen has taken the position in this
case that it exercised exclusive control over the site on the day of the accident, alleging
that it had "closed" the site to "all subcontractors" that day. (R. 656.)
16
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1.

No duty to supervise method or manner of work performance.

Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen has a duty to supervise or exercise
control over the method or manner by which its subcontractors perform their work, as
Sorensen suggests. (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 19,29-30.) The Utah Supreme Court has
already held otherwise. Thompson v. Jess, supra. Gonzalez's injury had nothing to do
with the method or manner in which soffit is installed - Gonzalez did not injure himself
by using a nail gun improperly, for example. Rather, the injury arose from a hazardous
condition on the premises to which anyone working in the area would be exposed.
The Tenth Circuit (applying Utah law) recognized this basic distinction in Titan
Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966). In that case, suit was brought
against a general contractor and owner for the death of a subcontractor's employee. The
general contractor challenged the trial court's instruction of the jury as to the duties owed
by it to the worker under Restatement § 343, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating:
As applied to a general contractor in control of a structure or premises upon
which work is being done, the rule is that such contractor is liable to an
employee of another contractor rightfully using any portion of the premises
for negligence in failing to keep it in a safe condition and to give warning
of latent or concealed perils. This rule is not inconsistent nor incompatible
with the general rule of non-liability of a general contractor for torts of an
independent contractor. . . . As Judge Warren L. Jones put it, "there is a
distinction between an unsafe condition incident to or resulting from the
work to be done and an unsafe condition inhering in the premises where it
is to be done"'
365 F.2d at 546 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Harsch v. City of New York,
78 AJD.3d 781, 910 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) ("Where, as here, a plaintiffs
injuries stem not from the manner in which the work was being performed, but, rather,
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from an alleged dangerous or defective condition on or at the subject premises, a general
contractor may be liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 if it has
control over the work site, and either created, or had actual or constructive notice of, the
dangerous condition.")
2.

No duty to remedy "all known or knowable" dangers.

Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen had an automatic duty to remedy "all
known or knowable" dangers, as Sorensen suggests. {See Brief of Appellant, pp. 17, 29.)
With respect to invitees, a possessor of land (to which Sorensen's duty analogizes) owes
only the duties summarized by the Supreme Court in Hale, all of which hinge upon
reasonableness. See pp. 27-28, infra. It is not strict liability.
Sorensen's duty to licensees and trespassers would be further limited.

See

Restatement §§ 333-339, 341. In Kessler, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a contention
that permitting attractive nuisance liability would place "an unnecessary burden on
homebuilders" and drive up insurance costs and housing prices, noting that a plaintiff
must still prove his claim, after all: "Homebuilders will not become liable automatically
for all accidents to children caused by conditions on the site." 2000 UT 95,ffl[8, 15.
Nor would a possessor (contractor) be responsible for transient conditions, or
conditions of which it could not reasonably have been aware and remedied, as Sorensen
suggests. (Brief of Appellant, p. 17.) See Price, 2011 UT App 66, f 10 (plaintiff must
show "(1) the defendant 'had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge
or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he should
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have discovered it'; and (2) 'after [obtaining] such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied if" (citations omitted)).
In this case, the power lines did not suddenly gravitate toward Building No. 4 on
the day of the accident; they had been in place for more than a year, and Sorensen admits
knowledge of their proximity. Sorensen further admits knowing that the situation could
have been remedied in various ways, e.g., by calling Rocky Mountain Power or sheathing
the lines.
With respect to the proximity, Sorensen's brief asserts a factual argument for
reversal that was raised for the first time below in its reply memorandum, i.e., that it was
Orchard Vista, not Sorensen, who was responsible for placement of the building so close
to the lines. According to Sorensen, all that it did was follow Orchard Vista's plans.
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 8, 15.) The problem with this argument is twofold.
First, Gonzalez's experts disagree, indicating that the original plans appear not to
have been followed. {E.g., R. 910, R. 991.) Second, Sorensen's argument overlooks the
fact that contractors cannot blindly follow unreasonable plans. As Comment f to § 384
states:
The fact that the person erecting the structure or altering the physical condition of
the land follows exactly the plans, specifications and directions of the possessor,
does not necessarily prevent him from being liable under the rule stated in this
Section. A servant or contractor entrusted with such work is usually entitled to
assume that the plans, specifications and directions given him are such as will
make the work safe. But they may be so imperfect or improper that the servant or
6

"[T]his notice requirement does not apply if the [unsafe] condition or defect was created
by the defendant himself or his agents or employees." Id. (alteration in original; internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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contractor should, as a reasonable man, realize that the work done thereunder will
make the structure or condition unsafe. If so, he will be liable even though he
exactly follows the plans, specifications and directions.
Utah law is the same. Trujillo v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, ^|§ 39,
42, 986 P.2d 752 (issue of fact as to whether plans were unreasonably dangerous;
summary judgment for contractor reversed), and cases cited.7
3.

No duty regarding risks inherent in the work.

Gonzalez does not contend that Sorensen had a duty with respect to risks that are
peculiar to, or inherent in, the work performed by subcontractors, as Sorensen suggests.
{See Brief of Appellant, pp. 20, 25-27.) The Supreme Court has correctly observed that,
when risks "inhere to the manner in which the work is done," it is more reasonable and
promotes safety to require the subcontractor to protect itself from such risks. Thompson,
1999 UT 22, U 31. •
If Gonzalez had been hired to repair or sleeve the power lines, then proximity to
the lines would have been inherent to his work. If a worker is hired to do welding, then
use of a welder inheres to his work. Unreasonably close live power lines are not inherent
to the installation of soffit (or stucco, or fascia, or to framing, or the other work that
exposed workers to the wires).

7

Sorensen also asserts that "it is undisputed that Gonzalez and his co-workers were the
only workers present at building four on the date of his accident; consequently, RSC
could not have directly contributed to Gonzalez's accident." (Brief of Appellant, p. 15.)
If a defendant digs a hole and then leaves, has not the defendant directly contributed to
the accident when an invitee falls in the hole? The same is true of a defendant who
creates and/or ignores a known power line hazard for more than a year, knowing that
anyone who works in that area will be exposed.
20
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After dispelling the various dire scenarios averred by Sorensen, it becomes evident
that adoption of Restatement § 384 will not shake the foundations of the construction
industry. It is instead, as the trial court concluded, sound policy. That reality is reflected
in the fact that all jurisdictions to have considered it have adopted § 384. See Smithey v.
Stueve Constr. Co., No. 04-4067, 2007 WL 172511, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 18, 2007), listing
o

jurisdictions and stating that the court is unaware of any jurisdiction rejecting it.
AM.JUR.'S

summary of the law is the same:

A person put in control of premises by the owner is under the same
duty as the owner to keep the premises in safe condition. To similar effect,
one who does an act or carries on an activity on land on behalf of the
possessor is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from
liability, for physical harm caused to others on or outside of the land as
though he or she were the possessor of the land. In such cases, the decisive
test of liability is control of the work, and not the actual transfer of
possession by contract. The duty of care owed by a possessor of premises,
however, exists only where the possessor, in the exercise of reasonable
care, knows or should know of such conditions. The duty of a possessor to
maintain reasonably safe conditions for use by an invitee is nondelegable: a
contract for its performance by another does not necessarily eliminate an
owner's responsibility, and does not extend to latent defects or conditions
that could not have been discovered by reasonable care, whatever conduct
that standard may require in a particular case.

8

While acknowledging (and listing) the string of jurisdictions that have adopted § 384,
Sorensen argues that "other states have considered and rejected Gonzalez's premises
liability argument." (Brief of Appellant, p. 23, citing Branum v. Petro-Hunt Corp., No.
4:09-CV-035, 2010 WL 1977963 (D.N.D. Mar. 15, 2010).) But that case - which does
not mention § 384 - does not aid Sorensen's position. Branum involved the question of
"whether plaintiff can hold [a general contractor] vicariously liable for any fault of [a
subcontractor]," not directly liable for its own breach of duty. Id. (emphasis added.)
Indeed, Branum concluded its discussion of premises liability by noting that its reasoning
"applies to any claim for premises liability that goes beyond holding the owner of the
premises liable for its fault and imposes vicarious liability for the acts of an independent
contractor." Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
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62 AM.JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 10 (citations omitted).
In short,
Independent contractors employed by the owner or occupant of
premises to perform work thereon are generally held to be invitees to whom
the owner or occupant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the
premises in a safe condition. . . . Such duty has been said to exist not
because of any contractual relation between the owner and the contractor,
but because of the general principle that an owner or occupant of premises
is bound to use ordinary care toward persons who come upon the premises
for a purpose in which the owner is interested. If the landowner or lessee
relinquishes possession and control of the premises to an independent
contractor, the duty of care shifts from the landowner or lessee to the
independent contractor.
L. Lehr, 2 PREMISES LIABILITY 3d § 39:7, and authorities cited.
Moreover, a number of courts (including the Utah Supreme Court in Kessler) have
recognized the applicability of premises liability to general contractors without explicitly
citing § 384. See, e.g., Cooper v. Nelson, 211 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying
Illinois law); Eischeid v. Dover Constr., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 448, 460 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(u[T]he Iowa Court of Appeals has recognized that a more general 'premises liability5
exception, based on a 'possessor's' control of the land, is also applicable to general
contractors.").
Indeed, Sorensen's own memorandum in support of summary judgment attached
two cases that recognized retained control and premises liability as separate theories of
liability against a general contractor. See Hillabrand v. Drypers Corp., No. 9-02-37,
2002 WL 31260045, % 21 (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 10, 2002) (unpublished) (R. 730), ("The
duty owed to frequenters, i.e., including employees of other companies, is no more than a
codification of the common-law duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises to
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invitees, requiring that the premises be kept in a reasonably safe condition, and that
warning be given of dangers of which he has knowledge. . . ."); and Rapoza v. Willocks
Construction Corp., No. 22052, 2004 WL 27460, at *17 (Haw. Jan. 2, 2004) (R. 735) (in
suit by subcontractor's employee, jury was correctly instructed that general contractor
Willocks had a "duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work. This duty runs to
whomever the Defendants require to perform work on the premises," and that "an owner
or occupier of the property owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons anticipated to be
on the premises.").
Sorensen points out that in a number of cases citing § 384, the plaintiffs are
members of the general public, rather than employees of a subcontractor. That is correct.
Other cases do involve workers. See, e.g., Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc., 457 N.W.2d
614 (Iowa 1990); Lloyd G. Oliphant & Sons Paint v. Logan, 12 So.3d 614, 618 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2009) ("The general rule is that a general contractor on a construction job who is in
control of the premises is burdened with the duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe
place for employees of a subcontractor to work." (citations omitted)); Franklin v. OSCA,
Inc., 825 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Ark. 1992) ("[Tjhis court explained the duties of a general
contractor to a subcontractor's employees. The court analogized the duties of a general
contractor to those of an owner of the premises.").
Significantly, Sorensen cites no authority adopting the distinction it urges between
worker-invitees and general public-invitees in a premises liability case.

Instead,

Sorensen relies only upon the Utah Supreme Court's exemption of workers from
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protection under the "peculiar" and inherent" risk theories of liability in Restatement §§
413-414, 416, and 427. See Thompson v. Jess, supra.
As discussed above, however, the court's interpretation of those sections followed
naturally from the fact that - by definition - the risks there were inherent in the manner
of work being clone by the subcontractors.

Why should a general contractor have to

protect a subcontractor from a risk that is part and parcel of the very job for which the
subcontractor was hired?
The same cannot be said for a hazardous condition on the premises. It was not
inherent in the job for Gonzalez to encounter an unreasonably close power line on the site
any more than it would have been inherent for him to encounter a pit of spikes.
Moreover, all subcontractors working in the area were exposed to the condition.
As a final contention, Sorensen argues that the court should consider the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 27-28 (citing "incentive inherent
in the [Act] for injured workers and the workers compensation carrier to shift liability to
other parties").) Sorensen expresses dismay that, under § 384, a worker or compensation
carrier could shift the loss for an injury to a general contractor.
That is true - because that is what the legislature has dictated. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized that the Workers' Compensation Act is a compromise, part of
which is the express right of employees and carriers to assert claims against negligent
third parties. Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, \ 28, 232 P.3d 1059.
Sorensen's concern about unfair shifting of burdens might have merit if the
alleged duty involved liability for a risk inherent in the work, which risk should be
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allocated to the subcontractor/worker himself. In such circumstance, it would indeed be
anomalous for the worker or his carrier to recover from a third party. See Thompson,
1999 UT 22, ^| 31. The opposite is true, however, when the risk is not inherent in the
subcontractor's work - in that case, it is unfair for the worker or his carrier to bear the
burden, rather than the negligent party.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND ISSUES OF FACT ON
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS.

Sorensen's brief does not appear to challenge the trial court's denial of summary
judgment if, as a general contractor in charge of the premises, it owed duties to Gonzalez.
Ample evidence supports the trial court's determination that issues of fact exist.
A.

Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen created the dangerous
condition.

As noted, Sorensen built Building No. 4, which was too close to the power lines.
Although Sorensen seeks to point fingers at Orchard Vista, even if Sorensen followed
Orchard Vista's specifications, a jury could easily find the erection of a building too close
to live power lines on its face unreasonable. (See pp. 19-20, supra.)
B.

Fact issues exist as to whether Sorensen took reasonable steps to
protect invitees from the dangerous condition once it existed.

Because a general contractor's liability under § 384 is co-extensive with that of the
owner or possessor of land, the next step is to analyze Sorensen's (in)actions as if
Sorensen were the owner or possessor. In this regard, it is instructive to explore Hale in
some detail. The facts there, as described by the Supreme Court, were as follows:
Beckstead, acting as his own general contractor, hired Hale to paint the
interior of his semiconstructed home in Santa Clara, Utah in 1996.
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Beckstead purchased the paint supplies and indicated generally how he
wanted the paint to look, but otherwise exercised no control over the
manner in which Hale was to accomplish the job for which he was hired.
Because the house was still under construction, a railing had not been
installed on the second floor balcony. While painting one day, Hale was
injured when he accidentally stepped off the second floor balcony and
fell to the floor below.
Hale, 2005 UT24, %3.
Hale filed suit against the owner/general contractor. The district court granted
summary judgment against him, reasoning that the owner owed no duty toward the
painter because the allegedly dangerous condition (lack of a railing) was open and
obvious. The case next went to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed.
This Court began its analysis by rejecting the defendant's argument (and
Sorensen's here) that the plaintiffs claim should be analyzed under retained control
principles, noting that the retained control doctrine has nothing to do with liability as a
possessor of land:
Beckstead asks us to decide this appeal by applying the rules of liability
for employers of independent contractors as outlined in the Restatement
section 409, its companion sections, and the case of Thompson v. Jess,
1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, which applies various sections of chapter 15
of the Restatement, including section 409. See id. at 13. Beckstead's
reliance on these authorities is misplaced. Thompson dealt with issues
of the "retained control" doctrine and the "peculiar risk" and "inherently
dangerous work" doctrines under the Restatement sections 413, 426, and
427, Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at 11 (quotations omitted), issues not
relevant to this appeal. More importantly, Thompson contains no
analysis with regard to the duty owed by a possessor of land to an
invitee. See id. And while section 409 has some applicability with
regard to the relationship between Beckstead and Hale (where Beckstead
did not participate in or control the manner in which Hale performed the
painting, such that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of care concerning the
safety of the manner or method of performance Hale chose to
implement), this analysis is not dispositive. As we discuss in detail
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below, Hale was a business visitor, an invitee on Beckstead's land—a
status wholly separate from any status he may have had as an
independent contractor, which no one disputes.
Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, U 11 n.2, 74 P.3d 628.
Analyzing Hale's negligence claim under §§ 343 and 343A, this Court concluded
that the claim was barred because the hazard (lack of a railing) was open and obvious,
and the owner/general contractor "could reasonably expect that Hale 'would take the
necessary safety precautions'" and "had no reason to anticipate that Hale would proceed
to encounter the unprotected balcony without taking the necessary safety precautions."
Id., \ 20 (brackets omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the latter ruling. The court first agreed that an
owner/general contractor's duty to subcontractors' employees is defined in Restatement
§§ 343 and 343A. Hale, 2005 UT 24, ^ 7. Under those sections, a defendant may be
liable for failing to make a worksite reasonably safe even if a dangerous condition is open
and obvious. The court noted:

"The Restatement does not so strictly define a

landowner's duty as to eliminate any duty to protect or warn his invitees of obvious
dangers." Id. at H 25.
The Supreme Court described a number of circumstances in which a duty exists in
the presence of an "open and obvious" danger on the possessor's property. For example:
•'

First, "if a landowner 'should expect that [an invitee] will . . . fail to protect
[himself] against [a dangerous condition],' the landowner must exercise
reasonable care to protect him." Id. (quoting § 343(b), (c)).

•

Second, "a landowner has a duty to protect his invitees from obviously
harmful conditions or activities on the property if the landowner 'should
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anticipate the harm' despite the obvious nature of the danger." Id. (quoting
§343A(1)).
•

Third, a possessor may be liable for a failure to warn or to take other
reasonable steps to protect the invitee "[w]here an 'invitee's attention may
be distracted, such that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget
what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.'" Id. at \ 26
(quoting § 343A cmt. 1(f)).
Fourth, a possessor may be liable if it "has reason to believe that 'the
invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a
reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh
the apparent risk.'" Id. (quoting § 343A cmt. 1(f)).

Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the trial court correctly found
issues of fact regarding the reasonableness of Sorensen's conduct.

A jury could

obviously conclude that Sorensen had reason to "anticipate the harm": Sorensen had
built the structure too close to the power lines, knew that workers would be exposed to
them, and took no steps to correct or protect against the dangerous condition. The trial
court correctly denied summary judgment.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT SORENSEN HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF
GONZALEZ'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS.

In a secondary argument, Sorensen faults the trial court for concluding that
Sorensen was sufficiently on notice of Gonzalez's negligence claim.

According to

Sorensen, it did not realize until Gonzalez "recharacterized" his claim in response to the
motion for summary judgment that Gonzalez might argue premises liability. (Brief of
Appellant, pp. 30-34.)9

9

Although not part of its argument for reversal, Sorensen's brief alleges that, after oral
argument, Gonzalez'scounsel "attempt[ed]" to submit "additional argument" "ex parte
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Sorensen's claim of surprise is rather perplexing, because it was Sorensen's
motion, not Gonzalez's response, that sought to add a cause of action to Gonzalez's
amended complaint that did not exist. Gonzalez's amended complaint did not state a
cause of action for vicarious liability, nor retained control.
In other words, Sorensen accuses Gonzalez of abandoning a claim that was not
there in the first place.

The amended complaint asserted two causes of action:

negligence and hazardous activity. The first paragraph of the negligence claim plainly
stated that it was based upon exposure to a hazardous condition on the property, alleging,
inter alia, that Sorensen:
a.
Fail[ed] to properly exercise and maintain a place of
employment, which was free from recognized hazards that were likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to individuals working on the
Property)
*

*

*

and without leave of Court." (Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) Sorensen refers to two trial court
rulings to which Gonzalez'scounsel referred during argument in response to Sorensen's
characterization of Gonzalez'sargument as "novel." {See Exh. 2, pp. 15-16.) Sorensen
says that "neither the trial court nor counsel for RSC accepted the copies offered by
Plaintiffs counsel." (Brief of Appellant, p. 9.) No citation is offered for that statement,
which is incorrect. With a 15-minute time limit (R. 1165, Exh. 2, p. 3), the undersigned
expressed willingness to provide copies of the referenced rulings, but did not ask to
approach the bench nor address counsel at that time. (Exh. 2, pp. 15-16.) Afterward, the
copies were provided as promised, with a cover letter stating only, "During the oral
argument in the above-captioned case, I made reference to the ruling in the following
cases [two cases identified]. For your convenience, I have enclosed copies of the
opinions in these cases. I have also provided counsel for defendant Sorensen with the
Memorandum Decisions." (Brief of Appellant, Exh. B.) It is hard to see how this was
either "additional argument" or "ex parte," but in any event, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in implicitly rejecting Sorensen's motion to strike the letter, characterizing
the decisions as informative. (R. 1585; see Rulings attached as Add. Exh. 3.)
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c.
Fail[ed] to ensure that the development of the Property did
not encroach upon the electrical lines lining the Property, or that proper
safety measures regarding power lines were followed, including cutting off
power to the electrical lines, insulating the electrical lines and protecting
the 10 foot safety c i r c l e ; . . . .
*

*

*

h.
Allow[ed] individuals to work on the unsafe scaffolding and
within 10 feet of the power lines when they knew or should have known it
was unsafe to do so.
Would Sorensen have claimed surprise if the complaint referred to hazards on the
"premises"? It is doubtful, yet "property" and "premises" are essentially synonymous.
See, e.g., Roget's Desk Thesaurus 415 (1996) (synonyms for premises include "buildings
and grounds, property, site"); We bster 's Encyclopedic
English Language

Unabridged Dictionary of the

1526 (1996) (defining "premises" as "c. the property forming the

subject of a conveyance or bequest").

Utah law has never adopted a "magic word"

requirement for pleadings. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d
1366, 1374 (Utah 1996).
If uncertainty existed, Sorensen had recourse. For example, it could have filed a
motion for a more definite statement. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d
1218, 1222 n.3 (Utah 1996). It could have submitted "contention" interrogatories. Two
years of discovery and motions provided ample opportunity to flesh out the parties'
positions. For example, Sorensen's principal Russell Sorensen was expressly questioned
during his deposition regarding the creation, location, and knowledge of the hazardous
condition. {E.g., R. 923, 945-950, 952-953, 1348-1349, 2067-2072.)
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Other indicia suggest that Sorensen was not, or should not have been, surprised by
Gonzalez's citation to premises liability:
Sorensen's answer set forth a premises liability defense. (R. 168, Tenth Defense:
("Discovery may reveal Plaintiffs damages were the result of an open and obvious risk
of which Plaintiff was or should have been aware and, accordingly, Plaintiffs claims are
barred.5').)
Sorensen's expert designation, filed a year before its motion, recognized
Gonzalez's claim as involving the presence of a hazardous condition. (R. 610 ("Since
Mr. Sorensen had not given permission, to John Clayton Construction, for work on the
north side of unit 12 he couldn't have anticipated that John Clayton Construction was
going to be exposed to the hazard of the power line and scaffold."), and asserting that
UOSH "had the best information with regards to the actual site conditions'" (Emphases
added).)
Sorensen's own motion for summary judgment cited cases brought by workerplaintiffs that expressly recognized premises liability as an independent basis of liability
against general contractors. See pp. 22-23, supra.
In light of the wording of the complaint and the accompanying circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sorensen was (or should have
been) on notice of a claim based upon a hazardous condition on the property, i.e., a
premises liability claim. Rule 8 requires only a "short and plain" statement of the claim.
Although Gonzalez correctly identified his claim as sounding in negligence, a party is not
even required to plead legal theories. Casaday v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2010 UT App
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82, H 12, 232 P.3d 1075; Baicker-McKee, et al., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK §
8(a), p. 285 (Thomson/West: 2008) (legal theories need not be pled under F.R.Civ.P.
8(a)); see also Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("In
characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the
pleading labels chosen.").
Sorensen cites various cases in which trial courts felt differently, ruling that a
party was not on notice of a claim. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 30-31.) Notably, however,
the offending parties in those cases there were attempting to change their factual
predicates. That cannot be claimed here - this case has been all about the power lines
from day one.
"The fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute while leaving issue-formulation to the discovery process. These principles are
applied with great liberality in sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of
action." Casaday, 2010 UT App 82, \ 11 {quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656
P.2d 966, 971 (court's brackets and ellipses omitted)); see also Mack v. Utah State Dep't.
of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f 17, 221 P.3d 194 (Rule 8 is to be liberally construed in
favor of the plaintiff).10

10

Even on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the trial court must "accept any reasonable
interpretation of plaintiff s claims." Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (reversing trial court's dismissal of complaint on grounds that vicarious liability
claim was not cognizable, because complaint could "reasonably be interpreted to be a
claim of direct personal responsibility" on the part of the defendant).
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In this case, Sorensen failed to recognize the possibility that a claim based on
"hazards . . . on the Property" might constitute a premises liability claim. To explain its
misapprehension, Sorensen says that Gonzalez should have affirmatively alleged that
Sorensen was an "owner" or "possessor" of land. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 2, 32-33.) But
such an allegation would have been incorrect.
As stated in § 384 and the other authorities cited above, the general contractor's
duty is "the same as" or "analogous to" that of an owner or possessor - but the general
contractor does not thereby become an owner or possessor. Gonzalez's identification of
Sorensen as the general contractor was correct.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Gonzalez respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the trial court's denial of Russell Sorensen Construction's motion for
summary judgment.
DATED this

27th

day of May, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

William J. Hansen
Karra J. Porter
Tyler V. Snow
Attorneys for Appellant
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I N THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF. THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT?, .STATE OP UTAH

mnnnsTHrerauR?

JOSE M. GONZALEZ,

Third Judicial District

Plaintiff,

JUL 3 0 2010

vs,

Bya

SALTt^sM^
Deputy Olsrk

ORCHARD iVISTA, LLC, PACIFICORP,an Oregon corporation d/b/a ••
ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER, R-M. REES
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah .
corporation d/b/a/ DESIGN STONE
CREATIONS, RUSSELL SOREN5EN
CONSTRUCTION, a sole
proprietorship, JOHN DOE
ENTITIES.1-5 and.JOHN DOES 1-5,

• . MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 080921130
Hon.

JOSEPH C.FRATTO, JR.

'.Defendants.

PACIFICORP, |
Third-Party

Plaintiff,

vs.; '; • • .'
JOHN CLAYTON C O N S T R U C T I O N ,
INC.,
;
'

i

.

Third-Party Defendant.
•i

.

-

•
Mi

i

'"'up*

..••

.

•••....«.,

?he ;above~entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Russell Spreneen Construction's Motion for Summary Judgment,

The

Court he^rd oral argument with respect to the Motion on July 21,
2010',

Following the hearing,, the motion was taken

.advisement, .

•

^n^^:
..v

The. Court having considered the motion,, memoranda, exhibits."
6 reached- thereto and for the good ,cau3e shown/ hereby enters the
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: GONZAL3Z v. ORCHARD VISTA ST' At,• .
.
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•

i
;
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'•

•

I MEMORANDUM DSCISION
i!

i,•

I'

.,

1
I

, following ruling,

;

.

L "

' •

;

-.-.

In support, of its motion Russell Sorensen Construction . •

•

("RSC") argues Utah lav/ is clear that 33 tj^e.. general contractor
on- the project, RSC cannot pe liable for the workplace,Injury of
> a John Clayton Construction' (nJCCn) employee unless RSC exercised
affirmative control over the.injury causing aspect of the work,
•Moreover/ asserts RSC, plaintiff*sattempts! to recast its claims
against RSC as direct, negligence claims fa til as it is undisputed
. that RSC ;did not directly participate in.JCC's performance in the
injury causing aspect of the.work and plaintiff's attempts to
impose landowner1 liability fails a? plaintiiff failed to .plead or
give notice of-this claim until the opposing memoranda.

Further,

• contends 'RSC,: because Orchard Vistc}, .LLC, another defendant in
this case!, . owned and possessed the ;propertyf-and there is no
evidence. RSC owned or possessed the property-plaintiff:»s claim of
premises CLialDiliry must fail, Finally, argues RSC, Utah has not
. adopted Restatement § 334 and. would not adopt it in this case as
":"

• . - • ' • '

"

'

i •

it is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of
non-liability.
;
•

'

i

• In opposition, plaintiff asserts he isjbringing a claim of
direct negligence, not vicarious liability,.;and based upon the
Utah Supreme Court!s decision in Hale v. Beokst&ad
'

.

'

-

-

•

•

•Page 2

«

;

.;
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2005 UT 24,
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P>

'. ' MEMORANDUM DECISION -

GONZALEZ v, ORCHARD VJ3TA Sfl AL.

I .'33, ll§ P.3d. 263' (which applied premises liability negligence
principles to claims by Subcontractors)', $ general contractor who
assumes-control of a site is a possessor of land and a
. .subcontractor's employee is'a business invitee.

According to

plaintiffr under'the Restatement, a possessor owes business
invitees an affirmative duty not to create a dangerous condition
'

• - .

'

'

•

.

.

-

.

* *

on the premises and owes a. further duty to take .reasonable-steps
to make the premises- 3afe,
In the present case, argues plaintiff; RSC created a
dangerous and unsafe condition by constructing building No, 4,
which contained Units 12 & 13, -in violation of the National
Electrical Safety Code, which requires minimum vertical and
horizontal clearances to the high voltage power lines,

The

problem was further compounded, asserts plaintiff, by the fact
that RSC .failed to take reasonable steps to make the premises
safe for subcontractors. .
.

• '. •;.

After reviewing the record in this matter, including

consideration-of plaintiff's claim of ''possessor liability,1'
which in light of Utah's liberal pleading standards, is
appropriate, the Court is not persuaded summary judgment can be
. granted in the instant.

Indeed, while no Utah Court has

. explicitly adopted this section of the'Restatement (Second) of •
Page 3
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MSWORANDUM DECISION

Torts, such a theory of liability has not been' rejected by the
Courts in Utah and indeed/ it haa been continuously adopted in
other jurisdictions.

Moreover, although not binding precedent,

district courts in Utah have also been persuaded of.its
applicability.
. Applied 10 the f^cts of this case, the Court finds it
sensible to conclude that when an owner relinquishes control of
property to a general contractor, that contractor must, beresponsible for any conditions it.creates on the property,
specifically, in this matter, the constructing of a.building and
its resulting conditions.

In sum, the Court agrees with

Plaintiff and-concludes that § 384.reflects sound policy and
should be applied in the instant-.-

j

•

.This: said, disputed Issues of material fact with respect to
whether ,RSC created a dangerous condition on the premises and .
further,-.whether RSC took reasonable steps to protect invitees,
precludes- summary judgment.

Russell Sorenaen Construction's

Motion for Summary Judgment is, regpectf

'DATED this 3 ) day of July, 2010
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1
2

P R O C E E D I N G S
I

(Electronically

3

THE COURT:

recorded on August 2 0 , 2010)

We are gathered here in the matter of Jose

4

M. Gonzalez v s . Orchard Vista and others, specifically

5

Sorensen Construction, and they are the defendants.

6

I Pacific Corp Corporation

7

I v s . John Clayton Construction, the defendant.

8
9

Then we have

-- Pacific Corp, a third party

What I have in front of me here and noticed
I is Russell

Russell

Sorensen Construction's motion

for

for summary

plaintiff

hearing

judgment.

10

We've allotted a half an hour.

I did observe that from James R.

11

Black a letter that -- and some courtesy copies of responses

12

I this motion

13

I request, if you will, of their other m o t i o n s , that it might

I believe were included in this, together with a

14

some sense that we entertain

15

these proceedings.

make

those motions during the course of

16

I

17

I to have these matters considered during

18

I proceedings and hear argument

19

to

Normally what I would have if Counsel were

agreed

the course of these

I would do that, but it seems to

me our time is limited, and I want the benefit

-- quite

frankly,

20

I it's a good argument here regarding the motion that's in front of

21

I me.

So the request

22
23

Let's have your appearances and the argument on Russell
Sorensen Construction's motion

24
25

is denied.

M S . PORTER:
I Hansen

Karra

for summary

judgment.

Porter, Heidi Goelbel and

for the Gonzalez plaintiffs.
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THE COURT:

2

MR. C U R T I S :

3

Sorensen

MR. R O S E :

5

MR. BLACK:
Clayton

7

Timothy Curtis and Mark Taylor

for

Russell

Construction.

4

6

For the p l a i n t i f f s .

Your Honor, Rick Rose for Pacific C o r p .
James Black and Matthew Black

for John

Construction.
MR. B A R R E T T :

Joseph Barrett

from Snow,

Christensen

8

and Martineau along with Tony Johnson on behalf of RM Rees

9

Construction.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. C U R T I S :

12

Russell

Sorensen

Who was anticipated
Your Honor, I'll

to be arguing

be arguing on behalf

MS-. PORTER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. C U R T I S :

And

I'll

be arguing

on behalf

of Gonzalez.

M r . Curtis, your motion.
Good morning, your Honor.

As I stated

16

earlier, I represent Russell Sorensen Construction.

17

Sorensen Construction was a general

18

I construction project

19

I of 13 separate housing

20

I buildings.

contractor on a residential

in Midvale, Utah.

The project

units that were housed

The plaintiff

Russell

was employed by John

consisted

in four

total

Clayton

Construction.

22
23

of

Construction.

13

21

today?

John Clayton Construction

was a subcontractor

of

Sorensen Construction, and John Clayton Construction was

24

I to install

25

project.

soffit, fascia
An additional

and siding on the buildings

hired

in the

subcontractor, RM Rees was hired by
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1

Sorensen Construction

2

to perform stucco work on the project.

On June 22 n d the plaintiff

and two of his

co-workers

3

had arrived at the project to perform soffit and fascia work on

4

the fourth and final building of the project.

5

his co-workers were the only workers present at that building

6

the date of the accident, but while working on the project

7

plaintiff was attempting to install a 12-foot piece of aluminum J

8

channel that came in contact with high voltage overhead

9

line and was injured during that contact.

10

The plaintiff

Utah has a long established general rule that

12

physical harm caused by another -- by an act or omission of

13

a contractor or its servants.

14

referred to this as Utah's general rule of non-liability

15

we don't have to continue to repeat the long phrase.

16

is not liable for the

and reference

The one exception to the general rule of

we've
so

non-liability

17

is the retained control doctrine.

18

judgment

19

Construction

20

liable for the workplace injury of John Clayton's employee

21

Russell Sorensen Construction exercised affirmative

22

the injury causing aspect of the work.

23

is straightforward.

Our motion for

THE COURT:

Wouldn't

summary

Utah law is clear that

as the general contractor

the

the

employer of an independent

For ease

on

power

11

contractor

and

Sorensen

on the project cannot

control

be

unless
over

Now --

it -- I don't mean to interrupt

you

24

here, but that sort of -- that's sort of a rubber hits the road

25

on this one.
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1

MR. CURTIS:

2

THE C O U R T :

3

I have exercised

4

Yes.
Isn't that a factual question whether

that kind of control that would make them

MR. C U R T I S :

Absolutely.

they

liable?

I think that's a factual

5

question, and it's a factual question that's been undisputed

6

the parties.

7

THE COURT:

Well, that was my next question.

8

where does that stand here in terms of a material

9

reasonably

What --

fact not

in dispute?

10

MR. CURTIS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. C U R T I S :

I believe
That

--

(inaudible) the question.

Absolutely.

14

by either the plaintiff or by John Clayton Construction.

15

Sorensen Construction apart from scheduling and sequencing

16

work on the project, he wasn't

17

on the project.

He scheduled

judgment

forth

facts in our motion

19

for summary

I believe we've set

13

18

by

Russell
the

swinging hammers or pounding

nails

and sequenced the work.

John Clayton Construction,
I test -- in the deposition

that are not in dispute

it's undisputed

in the

of John Clayton and its workers

that

20

Russell Sorensen Construction didn't

21

their work, what safety measures to undertake, what

22

they were going to use, what method or manner in which they were

23

going to perform their work, and it's undisputed

24
25

I Clayton Construction
performed

instruct them on how to do

that

had complete autonomy over how

their work on this p r o j e c t .

materials

John

they

I don't believe that
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has been disputed by anybody

2

John Clayton

3

of materials

4

the p r o j e c t .

5

their work.

6

They -- when they arrived at the project

I some scaffolding

that was installed by another

8

without consulting

The employees

operative

12

Construction

13

supervisory

14

sufficient

15

performed
control

decided

its work.

In Utah merely

to Sorensen.

19

THE C O U R T :

20

MR. C U R T I S :

21

THE C O U R T :

22

MR. C U R T I S :

23

THE C O U R T :

exercise
Clayton

possessing
is not
That's --

Well, as -- what does the record show here

I in terms of as the general
relation

in which John

over an -independent contractor

THE C O U R T :

or

scaffolding.

to trigger the retained control doctrine.

MR. C U R T I S :

25

for John Clayton Construction

control over the mode or manner

18

24

subcontractor,

At no time on this project did Russell Sorensen

11

17

there was

with either Russell Sorensen Construction

I RM Rees to utilize the

10

lengths

They determined when, where and how to perform

M r . Rees.

16

and its employees determined the

that they would use and that they would install on

7

9

in this process.

contractor what they actually did in

What did they do?
What Sorensen did in relation to -Well,

I know what they didn't do.

-- John Clayton
I understand

Construction?

your position

in terms

—

Sure.
-- of what they didn't do, but what did they

do?
MR. C U R T I S :

They would

schedule and sequence the work.
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1

They would

2

for them to come and perform their work, but they left how the

3

work was to be performed up to the individual

4

The subcontractors

5

left, up to them -- you know, Russell Sorensen may have said,

you

6

know, we'd like brown soffit and fascia, may have controlled

like

7

the color of the fascia or the soffit or the siding, but as far

8

as how John Clayton Construction performed

9

project, those are things that were left in the complete

10

let the subcontractors

THE COURT:

subcontractors.

its work on the

position, as the record

13

that other than scheduling

14

making

15

gutters,

some decisions

shows --- the record

your

in front of me

the work to be done, and

regarding

and

Construction.

So is it a -- just so I understand

12

16

ready

come out, put a bid on the project, and it was

total discretion of John Clayton

11

know when the project was

shows

apparently

color of soffit and

fascia,

that was the

extent?

MR. C U R T I S :

That was the extent, yes, your

Honor.

17

Indeed the only issue pertinent to whether Russell

Sorensen

18

Construction

is whether

19

they affirmatively

20

the work.

21

is liable

for the plaintiff's actions

controlled

the method or operative

detail

Now in order to counter our motion for summary

22

the plaintiff

23

argument.

24

their original p l e a d i n g s .

25

their opposition to summary

has raised

for the first time a premises

judgment,
liability

Now this is an argument that was never presented
It was presented
judgment.

or

in

for the first time in

The reason why
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they've

1

kind of taken this tact is because there is a case that was

2

released back in I believe 2009.

3

both sides have argued or used in their

4

I

It was the Magana case

that

favor.

Now we believe that the facts and holding of the Magana

5

demonstrate the Russell Sorensen Construction

6

summary judgment.

7

first time in an opposition

8

to try to defeat the summary judgment

is entitled

We also argue that the plaintiff

to

can't for the

raise new and novel theories in order
motion.

9

Most importantly, the argument that plaintiff

is making

10

is premised upon a legal theory that -- they argue the

11

of a restatement section that has not been adopted by Utah

adoption

12

I Courts, which would be inconsistent with Utah's general

rule of

13

I non-liability.

argument

If the Court were to accept plaintiff's

14

it would

15

that came before it.

16

severely undermine all of the retained control

Now in Magana

-- so this is a case that both sides

17

argued -- argues in their

18

that the general rule of non-liability

19

hires an independent contractor

20

control

21
22
23

favor.

the manner in which

The Court

have

in Magana pointed

out

recognizes that one who

and does not participate

or

the contractor's work is performed

I owes no duty of care concerning
the performance

precedent

the safety or manner or method of

implemented.

Now the Utah Supreme Court in Magana upheld the

24

court and the Court of Appeals' determination

25

Magana's claims -- all of the plaintiff's

trial

that all of

claims were
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2
3

I dismissed by the trial c o u r t , and that decision was
upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals except
I claim was a direct negligence

properly

for one, and

claim that was premised upon

4

allegation

5

and personally rid a load of trusses that fell onto the

6

I in M a g a n a .

7

(maintain

8
9

that the defendant's

supervisor

personally

assisted

a safe construction

site, failure

procedures

were considered by the Utah Supreme Court to constitute

11

negligence .
Now the Utah Supreme Court

13

considered

14

"By asserting

15

joints, Magana's n e g l i g e n c e

16

retained

19

direct

clearly demonstrated

what

it

the direct negligence of the defendant when it said,
that Campbell

himself negligently

rigged the

I Campbell's acts and not to Circle T's

relates

to

acts."

Now unlike the Magana case, in the instant case
Sorensen Construction
I performance

21

undisputed

didn't participate

of John Clayton

truss

claim exceeds the scope of the

control doctrine because his assertion

20

22

warn

known hazards, the

I failure to implement and follow safe work policies and

18

plaintiff

to disclose and

10

17

the

None of the remaining claims for failing to properly

of known dangers, the failure to correct

12

that

or assist in the

or the plaintiff's work.

that the plaintiff

Russell

It's

and his two co-workers were

the

I only workers present at the job site on the day of the a c c i d e n t .

23

They were the only

(inaudible) present on that building on

24

date of the accident.

25

employees

So there's nobody other

that the plaintiff

can claim directly

than John

the

Clayton

participated
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alongside them in the performance of their work.

2

Now while the plaintiff

asserts that its claims were

3

based on premises liability, we've argued -- we've pointed

4

four cases where the Utah appellate courts have said you

can't

5

raise new and novel theories, you can't attempt to amend

your

6

complaint

7

in an opposition

for a motion for summary

Now in each of those cases a plaintiff's
properly plead their new and novel theory resulted

9

disregarding

to

in the Court

the arguments and the dismissal of the unpled

10

claims.

11

complaint, I believe, in

12

months after filing it.

13

judgment.

failure

8

out

The plaintiff's amended complaint, they filed
'07, amended

Now the plaintiff's

their

it within three or four

amended complaint never alleges

that

14

Russell Sorensen owned or possessed

15

plaintiff's complaint alleges that Orchard Vista, a co-defendant

16

in this case, owned and possessed

17

entire discovery process plaintiff

18

for premises

19

its claims against Russell

20

direction.

21

to change their claims and say that Russell Sorensen

22

now owes the duty of a land owner.

23

the property.

the property.

In fact, the

Throughout

has been building

liability against Orchard Vista and has
Sorensen Construction

Mr. Curtis, may I ask this?

24

what the state of the record is, I understand your

25

regarding

raising this issue regarding

its claim
directed

in another

It's only now at this point that they're

THE COURT:

the

attempting
Construction

In terms of

the premises
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but the state of the record in terms of the material facts to

2

that claim would be what?

That is what -- let me ask that as a

3 I question.
4

MR. CURTIS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CURTIS:

Sure.
What are the material facts that -I think that's an interesting point that

7

you've seized on.

If you were to look at the plaintiff's

8

opposition to our motion for summary judgment, there's not a

9

material fact that's alleged that says Russell Sorensen owned the

10

property or that Russell Sorensen controlled the property.

11

argument is made in the body.

12

been alleged, I believe, in the plaintiff's statement of material

13

facts .

14 I

The

There's no material fact that's

So there's no real evidence before the Court other than

15

the plaintiff's allegation that Russell Sorensen was a general

16

contractor.

17

says that an owner can delegate its responsibilities to the

18

general contractor, and their argument is he's a general

19

contractor.

20

liabilities as a landowner.

21 j

If you apply the Restatement 384, Restatement 384

Restatement 384 says he can have the same

They neglect to point out that Restatement 384 also says

22

that the general contractor can then delegate those same duties

23

to the subcontractors, but there's been no material allegation.

24

There's been no allegation of material fact made by the plaintiff

25

to properly establish that Russell Sorensen should be liable
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under a premises

2

that was contained

3

liability

theory apart from the legal

in the body of their

THE COURT:

argument

opposition.

So would it be -- well, is the record in

4

front of me in terms of what are the undisputed material

facts,

5

or the disputed material

premises

6

liability, there is no record -- I mean there is no record in

7

front of me, actual

facts for that matter regarding

record

in front of me?

8

MR. C U R T I S :

9

was things that we've pointed

I think the only record that was

out in our reply memorandum

10

we've demonstrated

11

liability arguments against Orchard Vista and not

12

Sorensen Construction.

So apart

13

allegations of material

fact raised by either Russell

14

the plaintiff

15

against Russell

that the plaintiff's experts raised

Now the way they get --

17

THE COURT:

Russell

premises liability

Sorensen- or
type claim

It appears to m e , I suppose, your time is

up.

19
20

premises

Construction.

16

18

where

from that, I'm not sure of any

that would establish
Sorensen

presented

MR. CURTIS:

Can

I just stress one case briefly,

your

Honor?

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. C U R T I S :

23

allege this premises

24

distinguishable.

25

they say it's a Hale claim, the general contractor

I'll

give you 30 seconds.

Okay.

The one case that they use to

liability

case I believe is

completely

The Hale v s . Beckstead case that they use, and
in Hale was
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also the owner of the property.

2

factor

3

liability

in this case.

THE COURT:

5

MR. C U R T I S :

6

THE COURT:

7

M S . PORTER:

9

obvious

11

in Hale alleged

premises

Thank you.
Thank you, your Honor.
M s . Porter?
I think

it's

from both the argument today and the opposing

memo

I that Russell

10

The plaintiff

initially in their complaint against the defendant.

4

8

I think that's a distinguishing

Thank you, your Honor.

Sorensen doesn't really dispute our analysis of

applicable premises liability law, hence the fact that they
I 88 percent of their opposing memo trying to claim that

12

weren't

on notice of it and that's why they didn't

spent

they

raise it.

13

Let me do a couple of things, if I may.

One, I want to

14

briefly address the assertion that we did not present any

15

record with respect to a premises

liability claim.

Then

factual
I will

16

I go ahead and address what is really their main if not

17

I argument which is that we didn't use the right magic words in

18

only

our complaint.

19

With respect to the merits of the argument, I think

20

Counsel

21

in our view, just stated the obviously, vicarious

22

direct

liability.

23

Magana

said, and that -- we always thought was fairly obvious.

24
25

I

forgot

the key c a s e .

It wasn't really Magana.

The two are totally different.

What Counsel

liability,
That's

left out was the fact that the case

this has been established

since 2005.

Magana,

It's been almost
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years that general contractors have been on notice that

2

liability claims are v i a b l e .

3

what they call this general rule of non-1iabi1ity.

There's a big difference

4

I should really be called is general rule of

5

I liability, because that's what Magana said.

between

What it

non-vicarious
They said,

6

can't just assume that every claim by a subcontractor's

7

must be based on vicarious

8

premises

"You
employee

liability and therefore must have to

I show retained control e l e m e n t . "

Frankly, I don't know any

9

respectable plaintiff's attorney since 2005 that would still be

10

I arguing retained control when you've got the beauty of Hale v s .

11
12

Beckstead.
I

Then we hear, "Well, this is a novel" -- by the way,

13

we hear for the first time in the reply memorandum that this is

14

a novel theory, this is a desperate theory.

I believe

it's an

15

I established principle of law, your Honor, that the more often a

16

I party calls the other party desperate

17

When I reread that last night, I thought, you know what,

19

this right here -- Judge Hansen
J with our desperate and novel

21

from March of this year

cause of action against all contractors

in Utah,

subcontractors,

I employee, same type of pleadings that we've asserted

23

I

25

agreeing

theory that 384 is a cognizable

22

24

know

they're in.

18

20

the more trouble they

Here's Judge Lindberg

here.

from May 26 th , so two months

ago

agreeing with our desperate and novel theory as to Section 384.
I There is not a Court anywhere

in the country, and you notice
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couldn't find one either, that has said, " N o , we reject

2

3 8 4."

3
4

I brought copies of these -- they're
I decisions, but technically

Section

memorandum

they have no precedential

support.

5

haven't cited them, but I'm

6

and Counsel.

7

fair game to show that w e l l , gee, that's funny because so far all

8

the judges we've presented this theory to have agreed with u s .

9
10
11
12

What

is the general contractor
M S . PORTER:

that commends their

They did a couple of things.

created a dangerous condition on the p r e m i s e s .

Remember

14

I way too close, built this thing way too close to power

actual physical

condition

that

liability?

First

I talking about an

Now they say

it's

factually do we have here beyond

13

15

Court

Any time we get called desperate, you know,

THE COURT:
Sorensen

happy to provide them to the

We

they
we're

on the p r e m i s e s ,

i.e.,

lines.

—

16

THE COURT:

17

M S . PORTER:

18

in his deposition was asked,

19

configuration here that subcontractors were going to have to get

20

within

21

"Yes."

22

they created the dangerous; condition.

23

Now we read in their

24
25

Building the building
Y e s , physically.

He completely admitted

I these p l a n s .

Our expert

In fact, M r .

Sorensen

"Well, did you know because of

10 feet of these live power

this and yeah, vie didn't

too close it w a s .

it.

lines to do their

work?"

So that's the first

thing,

reply memo, "Well, the city

follow these p l a n s , but we did
says this, our expert

okayed

follow

says t h a t . "
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That's a flaming fact issue.

2

to a jury if they think they had a good reason for building,

3

constructing a building dangerously close to live power lines,

4

they can take that to a jury.

5

If they can -- they can present

The second things is -- so first they create the hazard.

6

Second, they allow invitees to be on the premises without

7

affirmative steps to protect them.

8

Hale v s . Beckstead where the Utah Supreme Court went on and on

9

about the different duties that are owed to invitees.

10

undisputed

11

that subcontractors

Now we quoted at length

from

It's

and employers are invitees.

You have to under the conditions we laid out in our

12

memo, and I won't belabor

13

you have to basically

14

to protect the invitees

15

has suggested

16

those given our time constraints, but

take affirmative

steps -- reasonable

from these hazards.

steps

No one, by the way,

it wasn't a hazardous condition.

It w a s .

Did they take any steps at all to provide invitees?

17

which they admit.

18

deposition testimony was, "Well, we were going to.

19

to later.

20

call Rocky Mountain Power."

21

testimony they

22

taking

The closest

No,

I think they came in any of their
We were

going

We were going to tell the individuals they needed

to

I think I saw that in some of the

attached.

Yet at the same time other

testimony was by then -- by

23

the time Mr. Gonzalez was injured, there had already been quite a

24

few subcontractors, employees already working

25

those power lines.

in that area

near

So again, is the jury really going to believe
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that he meant to do something and he would have done

2

You know, that's a jury question.

3

something?

So we have creating a hazardous condition on the

4

property, and then failing to take any steps, let alone

5

reasonable steps, to protect invitees

6

Now our expert -- or excuse m e , that

7

from that

property.

condition.

Our experts gave some pretty easy examples.

I mean

8

they -- Sorensen could have put a sleeve on it, could have

9

Rocky Mountain Power like he was supposed it and had it shut

called
down

10

during periods of time or gone over the -- you know, et cetera.

11

You know, those are the kinds of steps.

12

of that, not one thing.

13

THE COURT:

May I ask this?

They -- he didn't do any

The liability

stems

from

14

the fact that I as the general contractor that built a building

15

that was too close to the power lines that created this

16

for subsequent

17

work.

M S . PORTER:

Well, not subsequent work.

18

that is going while I'm

19

still --

20
21

THE COURT:

This is work

still the general contractor, while

Well, I mean subsequent to building

I'm

the

building.

22

MS. PORTER:

23

THE COURT:

24

M S . PORTER:

25

hazard

with.

Oh, right.
I suppose.
Or either subsequent to or in

conjunction

I mean if you -- the building may be done on other

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

parts

-191

or may be done on this part, but the fact is that it has to be --

2

they know that workers are going to be on this part and it's too

3

I close.

4
5

That -- and remember, this -- we're talking

about

liability because of their status of a general contractor.
I general contractor

owes the same duties under 384 which

The

every

6

single Court to look at has adopted, and one of those is to take

7

the affirmative

8

steps to protect people.

We even laid it out,

I you know, for them, and they haven't disputed, by the way,

9

those would have been reasonable

I0

steps and that they didn't

take

any of them.

II

So this is really a classic premises liability

12

So what do we get?

13

pleading

14

were arguing vicarious

15

Look at our complaint.

16

here that they claim they thought we were pleading.

17

here.

18

We get, ''Well, we didn't

know you were

-- you were arguing premises liability.
liability."

case.

We thought

You know what's

ironic

Look for the words vicarious

Every allegation we have against Sorensen

liability in here, and they

"But that's the only theory you should look at, your Honor.
I know, we want you to assume that's what they're pleading
in here, and don't

[what

24

I

25

I our cause of action is an allegation

say,
You

even

let them actually point

23

to

is in h e r e . "
Our very

in

is negligence.

20

though it's not

here?

It's not in

We don't ever allege vicarious

22

you

liability

19

21

that

first cause of action, very first

sentence in

that the defendants
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negligent because they -~ the property -- I'll

2

That's apparently

3

that they failed to maintain the place of employment which

4

free from recognized hazards that were likely to cause death

5

serious physical

6

I That's paragraph

7

statement

8

get to that.

the word we didn't use right, because we

said
was

harm to individuals working on the property.
28 of our amended complaint, our very

first

there.
Now their argument apparently is, "Well, it says

9

property,

it didn't say premises, so we didn't realize
Is that what their argument

property

10

could be p r e m i s e s . "

11

could not find any case law under Rule 8 that says we have to

12

I cite our case law, or even that we have to cite

13

provisions.

14

individuals working on the property.

15

liability

17

I I would be a little embarrassed

I don't honestly

to

That is a classic

premises

see how they can say that -- I mean
if I were defense Counsel

five

years after Hale came down and said, "Gee, we didn't realize
I a general

20
21

restatement

claim.

I

19

is, because I

We said you have a hazardous condition

16

18

or

that

contractor," which by the way -THE COURT:

Let me -- in Hale the dangerous

condition

I was what ?

22

M S . PORTER:

The dangerous

condition

is the proximity

of

23

the area where the invitees were going to be to a live wire.

24

that could have been rectified by, for example, making the wire

25

I not

live or insulating

that portion of the wire.

Now

So it is -- we
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2
3

I know the invitees are going to be right here, and we know
a live wire practically within arm's length of that.

6
7
8
9

See, one thing that we keep hearing is -- well,
I example, we heard the facts in Magana.
there.

for

That just shows it right

Magana, if I remember correctly -- and I did look at the

I complaint

they attached -- dealt with operation of a drill.

It

did not deal with an actual, you know, condition on the property.
I Then they say, "They didn't mention premises liability

10

Magana."

11

the form of negligence alleged

12

in

Well, I'd be surprised if they did because that wasn't
in Magana.

We alleged negligence.

We used the negligence term.

13

used the individuals working on the property.

14

have said premises?

15

thesaurus

16

completely caught by surprise."

17

That is a

I dangerous condition on the property -- on the premises.

4
5

there's

Okay.

I mean should we

We can -- you know, but get out a

for goodness sake.

Don't try to say, "We were

So the fact is -- oh, then there's one other I think

18

allegation.

19

I controlling

They say well, we didn't allege that they were
the property, but we actually did allege -- remember,

20

all Rule 8 requires is notice pleading and inferences.

21

if you're confused, why didn't they send us -- if they didn't

22

We

You

know,

I know what we were alleging, why didn't they send us any

23

interrogatories or something that said -- we didn't get any

24

contention

25

that said, "We don't know what your theory

interrogatories

in this case.

We didn't get word
is."

They didn't
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up the phone to say, "What's your theory?"

2

don't like premises liability because they are dead on that

3

I c1a im .

4

I

So instead, they're trying

What it is is they

to force us to make a claim

5

that we haven't made since 2005..

We specifically referenced

6

the fact that Sorensen was acting as the general contractor

7

[ the development of the property and for the project, which

8

I defined t e r m s , and they admitted

it.

9

I concerned,

They admitted

10

on.

We talk about hazardous

11

I deposition.

12

I

13

that issue was done.

for
were

As far as we were
it and we moved

condition in virtually

every

single

They don't claim otherwise.

The suggestion

that we had to plead Hale v s . Beckstead

in our complaint, I dare them to show me a case that says that.

14

I We said negligence.

15

I premises, or

16

I Given our time constraints, your Honor, unless the Court

We said hazardous conditions on the

(inaudible) property.

17

THE COURT:

18

M S . PORTER:

19

I going to point out a few other

Well,

That should have done it.

you have about one minute

Oh, all right.
things.

21

and that they failed to take any steps.

22

actually
I

a lot of

I'm

The -- I'd mention

they both created and allowed the hazardous condition

addressed

--

left.

Well, in that case

20

23

to

that

to maintain

There was a -- we

this.

We laid out quite a few of the facts.

In fact, you'll

24

notice that we successfully,

in my view, disputed almost

25

one of their facts, and their only response and reply w a s , "Well,
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those were irrelevant

2

actually, because it was an irrelevant theory they were arguing.

3

We also think John Clayton, to the extent that it added

4

facts that we asserted."

We agree,

anything different in his factual allegations, we agree with

5

I those, and we would

6

I any reasonable interpretation

7

I pled and we have given you tons of facts, most of which are

8

undisputed

9
10
11
12
13

incorporate those.

The fact is we pled

of that pleading of Rule 8, we've

as to the premises liability of Sorensen

THE COURT:

Construction.

In sum, though, you -- if I understand

premises

liability analysis that is what you're advancing

as

I opposed to a dispute with the contact that Sorensen has with

the

subcontractors?
M S . PORTER:

Right.

I mean

inherently they

15

the subcontractors

16

That's not really the same thing as contacting.

to work in an extremely dangerous

forced
condition.

They didn't

17

I them how to hold their, you know, torches or how to hammer.

18

didn't tell them any of that stuff, and we're not claiming

19

What they did was they did actually

20

extremely dangerous

21

23

you

I correctly in terms of what you agree here also is it's really a

14

22

under

They
that.

force them to work around an

condition.

We know from Hale that it's not good enough to say,
I "Well, that was their choice," or, "Well, the employee
negligent or the employee's boss was negligent."

24

I Court

25

J That's all comparative

tell

The

was
Supreme

in Hale said, "Whoa, whoa, those are all fact issues.
fault."
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So yeah, our theory -- we haven't pled

2

liability.

3

telling you that's all we've pled.

4

anywhere.

That's why it's kind of insulting for them to keep

5

THE COURT:

6

M S . PORTER:

7

THE COURT:

8

yeah, I'll

10

your efforts.

Thank you.
Thank you.

The time has expired, and
I appreciate

12

MR. BLACK:

--

I appreciate

all

Thank you, your Honor.
Your Honor, regarding those other matters,

I what we'd like to know is are you going to consider those on the

14

written memorandums, or are we to have oral argument on

15

THE COURT:

16

see here.

those?

Let me -- I note that -- in fact, let me

I made note here on the -- there were five m o t i o n s ,

I and on the 16 t h of July, which is the same date -- I guess

18

was connected with your notice to submit.

19

for oral argument made by any -- either -- any of the

20

I'm

Thank you.

M S . PORTER:

17

complaint

I understand your position.

take the matter under advisement.

11

13

It's not in their

I going to take the matters under advisement.

9

vicarious

I

MR. BLACK:

I think we were asking

this

Was there a request

for oral

parties?
argument

21

for -- if it was to be for the Court to happen at this time,

22

obviously

23

them now.

24
25

leaving

that to your discretion as to whether to hear

THE COURT:

Well, it was now, but

to submit or the motions themselves

I mean

is the

-- the memoranda
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oral

argument?

2
3

MR. BLACK:
request that

4
5

That was my intent.

If it was left out,

I'd

now.

THE C O U R T :

W e l l , it's been my procedure here that -- my

policy that if the parties

request oral argument

I grant it.

6

MR. BLACK:

Very

7

THE C O U R T :

But we're not able to -- at this point to

well.

8

schedule the hearing on that.

9

the notice to submit, and that was one thing I was going

10

indicate.

11

due course.

12

something

Let me take a look at -- I do have

There is a notice to submit, and so it is handled

in

We'll arrange to set it for -- Nicki's going to say

to me that --

13

(Court confers with court

14

THE C O U R T :

Nicki

subject with her and we decided

16

if we couldn't

17

it.

schedule

MR. BARRETT:

clerk)

reminds me that I had broached

15

18

to

the

to take a minute or two here, see

it if everyone is prepared to

schedule

Your Honor, may I add just one other

19

thing, at the risk of being presumptuous.

20

effort -- and it's been no small effort because of the number of

21

parties -- to schedule mediation, and that's scheduled

22

20 t h --

23

MS.

24

MR. BARRETT:

25

(inaudible).

PORTER:

August

We had gone to the

for July

20 t h .

August 20 t h ,

sorry.

I think that this particular

August 20 t h , a little
issue between
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(inaudible)

2

know there's heavy demands on the Court's calendar, but I just

3

want to make the Court aware of that.

4
5

is pivotal

THE C O U R T :

All right.

MR. B A R R E T T :

7

THE C O U R T :

9
10
11

question

All right.

As I say, my

see if you're

there is a
in a position

to take just a minute here and with everyone present and try to
I schedule that.

Is everyone

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. ROSE:

15

Rick Rose on behalf

16

John Clayton

17

notice to submit

18

Corp's

21

August 20 t h .

I notice to submit, we thought we might

MR. CURTIS:

20

20 t h .

August

is is in terms of these five motions, which

12

19

That's -- when is your

I mediation?

6

8

if that's going to be successful, and I

Sure.
All right.
Your Honor, could

I just make one

of Pacific Corp.

One of the motions

has filed that I don't think is subject
is a motion

indemnity claim.

I to file an opposition
against

in a position to do that?

for summary judgment on

We intend

comment?
that

to that
Pacific

in the next about a week or so

to that and a cross motion

for

indemnity

the other parties.
So I don't know if you want to -- as

22

scheduling

23

even have yet a third hearing.

24

that we do anticipate there being motions

25

filed on Pacific Corp's indemnity

we're talking

about

a hearing date to include that in that hearing, or
I just wanted

to raise the

for summary

claim -- third party
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claim.

2

THE COURT:

W e l l , let me say this.

I want to do that

3

in just a minute or two if we can do it.

4

minute or two, we will find some other way to do it, but I think

5

If we can't do it in a

I we need to schedule a hearing and give you sufficient time, but

6

if it's going to be an omnibus hearing all pending motions, then

7

I'm willing to do that.

8
9

MR. BLACK:

All pending

motions?

I did agree that the motion that Mr. Rose

is talking about was my motion dealing with the High Voltage

10

Overheard Lines A c t .

I'm

certainly willing to have all those at

11

the same time provided they have adequate time to respond.

12

That's -- that I would give

them.

13

THE COURT:

W e l l , we can set it that way, but I --

14

MR. BLACK:

The sooner the better, but with the time

15

that Mr. Rose needs to

16

THE COURT:

respond.

Well, the argument

there would be -- well,

17

I want to be efficient with this, but I don't want to be in a

18

situation

19

heard that everyone gets about three minutes.

20

helpful to you or to m e .

21
22

MR. ROSE:

25

I think

THE COURT:
here.

That's not very

it makes sense probably

indemnity claim, let's just argue that

23
24

in which we have so many motions, so many parties to be

for our

separately.

Well, that may be what I'm

thinking

So I think maybe these five motions outlined

in your --

I Mr. Black, in your letter here of the 16 th , or your request of the
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16 th , if we set that at one time, all five of those, that seems

to

2

make sense.

--

Is everyone agreed to that?

Does that make sense

3

MR. BLACK:

Yes, it does.

4

THE COURT:

-- to argue those five together.

5

If I gave

you 45 minutes?

6

MR. ROSE:

I need an hour, I think.

7

THE COURT:

An hour sounds good?

I'll

give you an h o u r .

8

That needs to be sometime after -- oh, no, I guess at any

9

here that we can find an hour.

What I'm

going to have to do

10

because of -- in terms of -- the calendar

11

up here, but any day at 1 o'clock,

12

Tuesday, August the 3 rd .

13

MR. BLACK:

14

M S . PORTER:

15
16
17

THE COURT:

1 to 2.

filled

Let me throw out

Tuesday, August 3 rd .
I think we can do that.

We don't

really

Ail right.

I am looking

for

(inaudible)

M s . Porter.
M S . PORTER:

19

THE COURT:

Yeah.
For those that -- 1 o'clock

August, does that work for everybody

21

MR. ROSE:

22

THE COURT:

August

hour, these five m o t i o n s .

24

notice of that to you.
(Hearing

3 rd , which

the 3 rd of

-- for those --

3, not 3-0?

August

23

25

is pretty well

have a bog in most of that p i p e .

18

20

time

August 3 rd .
is Tuesday,

Thanks for coming

in.

1 o'clock, 1
We'll

concluded)
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Decision, Aguirre/Rosales v. Newell K. Whitney
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FILED
MAR 0 3 Mi>
41;i:; i/iu-.i'i;*.'!

V
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GUADALUPE RUIZ ORDUNEZ,
GUADALUPE ELEN LAZARO ROSALLS.
and BEATRIZ CHAVEZ SANDOVAL,
1

1

s

P'

j

Plaintiffs,

1 NEWELL K. WHITNEY, RISUN
1 TECHNO! OGIES, and MUDDY BOYS,
l
> INC..

Date: March 3, 2010
Case No. 080400743
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Division 2

Defendants.
i

The matters before the court are the motions

r: *' K

defendants Newell K. Whitney ("Newell Whitney"), Risui: I cchnoiogies inc r'kistm •and
Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Muddy Boys"). Oral arguments were heard • \ !< ••, ^--i- np

;

h •• .

2010, at whicli time the court took the motions under advisement. The court now issues this
decision denying the motions for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND
Defendant Newell K Whitney ("Newell Whitney") was building a home in Alpine ("the
I lome") froi n 2005 to sometime in 2007, Newell Whitney was the owner of the Home as well as
the general comrade «i *h<-. onstruction ^f the M-unc Defendant Risun Technologies, hie.
K;;.un" ) is ouneu ; j . * *' nitncy New-, il \\ hniiev y. brother. Risi in drew up the plans for the
Home and obtained the necessary building permits for it. Apparently when Newell Whitney was

l\u-c
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procuring subcontractors for the Home, he signed some of the contracts as "agent" of Risun.
There is a dispute regarding whether Newell Whitney had any actual or apparent authority to act
as an agent on behalf of Risun. In his capacity as general contractor on the Home, Newell
Whitney hired Muddy Boys, Inc. ("Muddy Boys") to do the drywall in the Home. Muddy Boys,
in turn, hired Allstate Drywall ("Allstate") to hang the drywall. Other subcontractors were hired
to do the taping and texturing on the drywall
The Home was approximately 13,000 square feet and included a four-story elevator shaft.
On the morning of the accident, Newell Whitney told two Allstate Drywall employees to wrap an
exposed beam and some television cable at the very top of the elevator shaft The two employees
were Guadalupe Rosales and Ramon Aguirre. They apparently attempted to perform some work
within the elevator shaft and were found a short time later at the bottom of the shaft in extremely
critical condition and with injuries consistent with a long fall Ramon Aguirre was pronounced
dead at the scene, and Guadalupe Rosales suffered severe, permanent injuries. Ramon Aguirre's
wife, plaintiff Guadalupe Ordunez, filed suit against Newell Whitney, Risun, and Muddy Boys
(collectively "Defendants") in case number 080400076, which was assigned to this court.
Plaintiffs Guadalupe Rosales and his wife plaintiff Beatriz Chavez Sandoval (all plaintiffs
collectively "Plaintiffs") also filed suit against Defendants in a separate case, case number
080400743, which was assigned to Judge Taylor. Both cases asserted causes of action for
negligence against Defendants. On July 15, 2008, this court signed an order of reinstatement and
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consolidation ordering that case 080400076 be consolidated with case number 080400743. Rule
;>uV2io!-fw i !Rc "*> t.\........ (;,.
case, which is this court.
Or,

X - M - ,•

'.-'.lu^k.;

-

I;M

'•"**»

-o; ' • '>•

•
\'"-i

i!- nak'o assignee ..- UK r :

•

•

^

-

-:..

•

-l

•

.

i

.• .

j.jiH^h

;i

o ' b

opposed the motion and Newel! Whitney filed his reply and a request to submit the motion »UJ
• l-'-ri^iiv. u

"'i : .•!' . . -•

< '• •,-

-t •;., •.• \] iK j

and on October 26, Risun moved (or summary judgment.
sui i m^ 1 * >' '* ••"•i*

p-o

^ - 'i

-<v . ,.,. r E-. uin-'u'r. ud^ment,
\!' three defendants argued that

'di-'.Mi: " ;, ,;*(.-.

ritrol ovci the i i letl i.od that

caused Plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs opposed the motions hied bv Risun and Muddy Bovs. and
»<* i n n . " . :

•i

.i 1

,- .!. ; ^'

:_, ; . » { * •

.1

, ^

"

; n a i t ; u n i e » " -i

\o.

Boys filed a reply on January 29, 2010. [lie court heard oiai arguments on all three motion? -m
February I.
DISCUSSION
The ntnlions foi «;nntinan mdgmenl filed hv flic Defendant are denied, Rule ,So of'lht
I Jtah Rules of c ivil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and states that the court
shall grant suumuirv judgment iHhe mo\ ing pnrt) show- uIh ii tin n r, no genuine issut of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ,
P. 56(c) (2009). In addition, "|t)he party moving loi snmni.n'^ pidgincm has the burden of
presenting evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists." Uintah Basin Med, Ctr. v.
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Hardy, 2008 UT 15, \ 16,179 P.3d 786 (citing Rule 56(e)). The Utah appellate courts have
made clear that "the nonmoving party is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of
record." Id at % 18 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 10, 48 P.3d 235). Pursuant to
this standard, the court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the
court from granting summary judgment to any of the Defendants. Specifically, the court
concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Newell Whitney's duty of care
as a possessor of land. There are also genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Risun
and Muddy Boys were possessors of the land under a premises liability analysis. Therefore,
summary judgment is not proper and the motions are denied.
Plaintiffs concede that none of the Defendants are liable for negligence under a retained
control theory of negligence, but they assert that this theory of negligence is irrelevant to their
case pursuant to Magana v. Dave Roth Const., 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143. In Magana, the Utah
Supreme Court explained, "The retained control doctrine is separate and distinct from a direct
negligence theoiy. Specifically, the retained control doctrine does not apply when a plaintiff
alleges that an employer's own actions were negligent." Id. at ^| 37.
Plaintiffs assert that they are pursuing each of the Defendants for direct negligence on the
basis of premises liability as set forth in Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263, and §§
343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under this theory of negligence, a
possessor of land is liable for physical harm caused to invitees by dangers on his land only under
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specified circumstances. Specifically, section 343, entitled "Dangerous Conditions Known to or
'• v < ) \ i f a ' * '

-\ I'M* v.- . i

•

• ^les,

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical hai m caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care
would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable
care to protect them against the danger.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343. Sir nilarly, the rele\ ai it poi tioi I of section 343 • \ 'Ki icivv i i
or Obvious Dangers," provides. "(V* A possessor nfland n n^t nabie to his invitees ior physical
harm caused to them by an \ u ^ •• • • . .<i.*n

••

^- • - l ; : ! - ^ -,.-...•, .

?••

to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness." Id. at § 343A.
The court in Hale explained that the open and obvious danger rule as set forth- i; sections
343 and 343 A of the Restatement was the applicable law in ... a--, v. ht i,- !. ••• i . :
painter working for the defendant owner of the home who w d$ aiso the general contractor. 2005
U'l 24, • *•

:

'\r plaintiff in Hale waspaintim' a v^-'u-

*i.

• •'rnd.in'

'• ••

second lioo: ^i UK lu^ne. Id. at f 3 A railing had not been installed on the seconu iioor
balcony, and the plaintiff stepped off the balcony when painting and was injured. Id. In further
explaining tlic open and obvious danger rule, the court explained, "[I]t is a duty-defining rule that
srmply states that, under appropriate circumstances, a landowner's duty of care might not include
warning or otherwise protecting visitors from obvious dangers." Id. at 1[ 23.. The court stated,
Page 5 of 7
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"[T]he law simply requires owners to take reasonable steps to protect invitees. This duty does
not require that landowners fully remedy potentially unsafe conditions, only that landowners
adequately warn invitees about such dangers." Id. at % 30. The court then held that the grant of
summary judgment was premature because "the Restatement rule requires an inquiry into
whether factors existed to vest in the defendant a duty to warn or otherwise protect the plaintiff
from an obvious harm[ J" and the facts regarding this inquiry were not developed below.
In support of their argument that all Defendants were possessors of land under the open
and obvious danger rule, Plaintiffs cite to section 384 of the Restatement. Section 384 provides,
"One who on behalf of a possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the
land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as though he
were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside the land by
the dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in his charge."
Restat. 2d Torts § 384. Comment d to this section clarifies the application of this rule to
contractors and subcontractors and states, "in such a case, the rule stated in this Section applies
to subject the particular contractor or subcontractor to liability for only such harm as is done by
the particular work entrusted to him." Id. at comment d.
Neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly adopted
this section, but Plaintiffs argue that it applies to render each of the Defendants "possessors of
land" within the meaning of the open and obvious danger rule. It appears that there are genuine
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issues of material fact regarding which of the Defendants were in charge of the elevatoi shaft. It
is the pi <:n ii ice of tl le f indei of fact to ciciei i nine wl lich ol the Defendants wei e "possessors" of
the elevator shaft foi purposes of premises hahlil\ uul if 'lies' look reasonable steps le
adequatelyprouxi iiK w : v^ • :-MI •" •.

-.t .-u

r-

.\. i

judgment are denied.

• •
CONCLUSION

Defendants' inotions for summary judgment are denied. The court concludes that there
are issues ; ..-.aieju.j i;iei f- JMUIII-J1 ui •

' *><- i >• :.*r«ci.. ' -<••• \-^ -ussors of the ele \ ator

shaft for purposes of premises habdiiv JM: \vhrthet 'hey took reasonable steps to protect workers
in that area. Therefore, the motions aie denied ( Ymnscl tot Pbintifi shall prcpau: an ,'ippiopnaU
order consistent with this decision for signature by the court
-7 A ^
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MATT CHRISTENSEN, et al.,

Case No. 090906593

Plaintiffs,

Judge Denise P. Lindberg
Date: May 25, 2010

J ... H A K U V CONSTRUCTION COMI'A.s-. aKa
! ! HARDY CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendant.

r

hi^ matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

considered trie arguments, Ine Moiiuu i, uKA.\ i f ; ) IN !' \K \

Havme »M11J

,-i I j -..\ir.D IN I'AK I ^peo;ik,aii\ ihe

< ;iurt agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs' vicarious liability theorv of "retained controPfails. However,
F:;imuns may proceed u> tna! on iheir two theories oi direct l u ^ n r .
This cast' involves an accident at a constmotion site Plaintiff, Matt Christensen, was injured when
1 ic fell approximately 12 feet down an open staii we
the Prime Business Center construction project

he ! m:c i •: \:

: i i u ni istensen was working on

Defendant, J.I Hardy Construction, had been hired to be

the general contrau ioi me piojeci. PeienuaM .^ i MIVU i c n e i U:CK as a .-.tnconiKsc • : \-. ;rame :he
building. Christensen worked for Cobble Creek as the project manager over this project.1
Mil.

-J! [.'IK' f ; . 1 * 5 #r K H C !: '

',{1

M IMCUM':'

m . i;i JC 4 -

i ' i m n l s f i s -i*

-

;

i-

negligence. The first two are direct ilegligencc theories: (1) that Defendant is liable as a possessor of the

*At the hearing, Defendant presented copies of deposition testimony which h;ui nut txc-n
attached to any of the memoranda regarding this Motion. Defendant argued that tins testimony was
material to the determination of the Motion. Plaintiffs objected. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that it was improper for Defendant to rely upon new evidence at the hearing. Although Defendant
argues that Plaintiffs' counsel was already aware of the deposition tesdmony, Defendant did not give
Plainrif fs an appropriate op p o 11 u 1111 y to p r e p a re to me e t th e pro ffe red tes timoiiy. 1 'h ere fore, th e
Court dues not consider the new evidence
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land and (2) Defendant is liable for interfering with Christensen's work and forcing him to work in unsafe
conditions. Plaintiffs third theoiy is that Defendant is liable under the indirect negligence theoiy of
"retained-control." In bringing this Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any of the
alternative theories of liability. Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot prove the cause of
Christensen's injuries because there were no witnesses to the accident and Christensen himself does not
remember the accident.
L

Direct Negligence
A.

Possessor of Land

Plaintiff and Defendant disagree over whether Defendant can be held liable for failing to protect
Christensen against the open and obvious harm of the hole. The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff can
proceed on this theory of negligence.
The Utah Ccse that governs this issue is Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263.2 In Hale,
the court adopted the Restatement Second of Torts §§ 343 and 343 A. Section 343 provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by
a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
Restat 2d of Torts, § 343. This section is read together with Section 343 A, which provides:
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or

Plaintiffs also cite Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628. However, the supreme
court case overruled die court of appeals case in part and so this Court will rely on the supreme
court case to establish the rule.
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obviousness.
(2) In determining WIIL
I possessor should aniicip
>wn or
obvious danger, the faci inai me invitee is entitled to mai
/_ „; r -uLi^ tana, or of
the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating that the harm
should be anticipated,
R estatemei it 2< i of 1 oi ts, § 3- 13 A
In discussing these sectioi is, Hale said, "the Restatement sections 343 and 343 A , ..(lefin.es
!>
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Where an im itee is injured by a condition on land iioin wlrt h the possessor did m-i owe a tint> 'u
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invitee's attention may be distracted, such that he will not discover what hi;- obvious, o* cd! ' n : *<
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1 orts § 384, a contractor is iieated as a possessoi oi hud it n 'civets a slmcture or creates an othei
,'5iM

i

•

-. ,

!»;

:.'':.] v. ,.ic y • M' ,:i eeptaiu t- ^\i • •

idopted in Utah. Sec SmitJwy v Suave ( '^tisiruenan

•• h ^ 'i * i* • >r ' ^ ^ ^•'!'

( 7;.s UK)'/ I- S. Dist. LHX1S ^8 I (' > N j>

2007) ('V\t least twenty-one other states, including several m this ;c.p I on. iiave followed r -co ; •
law rule contained in § 384 and stated that a contractor working on behalf of a landowner stands m
the landowner's shoes for purposes of premise liability.").
The Court is persuaded that it is appropriate to rely on Restatement 2d, Torts, § 384, and find
that Plaintiffs can proceed !<- -\ miv u- v> -n this theory of liability. As referenced above, tlus
approach is widely accepted ,n other |uiisdictions. Additionally, it reflects the sound policy that
when the owner of property has relinquished control of his/her property to a general contractor, the
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general contractor must then be responsible for the conditions it creates on the land.
In the present case, there are clearly questions of fact regarding whether Defendant had a duty
to protect Christensen from the hole into which he fell. First, the parties dispute who created the
hole. Defendant says that Cobble Creek had placed the floor joists and covered them with flooring,
leaving an opening for the stairwell Further, Defendant asserts that Cobble Creek had a contractual
obligation to ensure the safety of the stairs. Section 2.8 of the contract between Cobble Creek and
Defendant reads in part:
SUBCONTRACTOR, ITS AGENT, EMPLOYEES, MATERIALMEN AND
LOWER TIER SUBCONTRACTORS SHALL PERFORM HIS WORK IN A SAFE
MANNER; (1) TO COMPLY WITH PREVAILING SAFETY REGULATIONS,
INCLUDING THE APPLICABLE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT
AND THE CURRENT REGULATIONS ADOPTED THEREUNDER, (2) TO
PROVIDE SAFE TOOLS'AND EQUIPMENT, (3) TO HOLD WEEKLY SAFETY
MEETINGS, (4) TO INSTALL BARRICADES, SIGNS, FLAGS, LIGHTS AND
OTHER SAFE GUARDS TO PREVENT INJURY TO WORKERS AND OTHERS
ON OR ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION S I T E , . . . .
Plaintiffs counter that Cobble Creek did not cover the stairwell because it was directed not to do so
by the plans and specifications. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that another subcontractor installed
the steel beams/columns for the stairwell and Cobble Creek just built around those. Plaintiffs say
that the open stairwell was in a common area, to which multiple subcontractors/workers were
exposed. Even though Cobble Creek had to perform its own work safely, it was not responsible for
erecting barriers around hazards that it did not create and which posed risks to all workers on the job
equally. Plaintiffs, therefore, assert that it was Defendant's responsibility to keep the open stairway
safe based on the provisions of the contract between Defendant and Prime Business Center LLC
wherein Defendant accepted responsibility for "safety control55 and "supervision" at the job site.
The Court disagrees with Defendant's assertion that the open and obvious doctrine does not
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apply to general coi ltractor/si ibcoi ltractoi i elatioi ishipsil id Jta h Defe ndai it says tl miDi lyiom » P > eey
148 P. 408 (I Jtah 1914) and Thompson v. less, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322,. hold that the open and.
c I)1 ""ions docti ine doesn' t apply to coi ltractors. I Iowever those cases are i lot directly on poii it
Thompson clearly says that sections 413,416, and 427 of the Restatement Second o f Forts "have no
application wl leu the In...]t ireci persoi i. is an eiiiployee of tl le indepei ident contractoi i indertaking tl :te
allegedly dangerous work." 1999 UT 22 at *p0. Thompson does not discuss whether sections 343

held that the owner "having neither reserved nor exercised dneetion or control over the work ot ihc
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Interference with Job Duties

Plaintiff alleges that the direct negligence alleged against Defendant relates to Defendant's
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"affirmative actions that forced Matt to build the wall in question in a way that was less safe. But
for J.L. Hardy's actions, Matt would have build the wall in a manner that not only would have been
safer, but would have obviated the need for exposure to the open stairwell." Memo in Opp. at iv.
The Court accepts that there are questions of fact regarding whether Defendant owed a duty to
Plaintiff and whether Defendant breached that duty. Specifically, when the Court views the facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and accepts all of the assertions in Plaintiffs' expert reports, it
is possible to conclude that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff, that Defendant was negligent in its
management of the construction site, specifically, the safety aspects, and that Defendant's negligence
was a primary cause of Plaintiffs accident. This is sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Z

Retained Control
Defendant argues that it did not exercise control or "retain control" over the injury-causing

work. The Court agrees with Defendant.
The "retained control" doctrine is discussed in the seminal case of Thompson v. Jess, 1999
UT 22,979 P.2d 322. In Thompson, the defendant Jess contacted AmeriKan Sanitation and arranged
for purchase and delivery of a large pipe. Id. at ^|2. When the AmeriKan employees, Dennis and
Trevor Thompson, delivered the pipe., Jess asked them to install the pipe. Id. at p . Despite
responding that they were not equipped to erect the pipe, Jensen agreed to install the pipe and then
Jess went back inside. Id. at ffl|4-5. Jensen and Thompson attempted to install the pipe and
Thompson was injured in the process. Id. at ^|5. The court then discussed whether Jess would be
liable for Thompson's injuries.
The Thompson court discussed the "retained control" theory by noting that "Utah adheres to
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the general common law rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable f 01 plnxj. al
harm, caused by another by an act or omission of the contractor of his servants," Id. tt *: h
general rule recognizes that one >\h< .;••

i • \-

. .;denendent contract* ai\! dor- roi -\ •: MV.'

control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the
safety of the manner or method of performance implemented."' Id

Nevertheless, the 7 Iwmp son

court noted that there are exceptions to the general commoi 1 law rule, and that "retained control"
is a narrow theory of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an
employer of an independent contractor exercises enough control over the contracted
work to give rise to a limited duty of care, but not enough to become an employer or
master of those over whom the control is asserted. The duty is such situations is one
of reasonable care under the circumstances and is confined in scone lo the control
asserted.
- a j it 1|15.
The Thompson coin t adopted the "active participation* standard to dct'-nninc a -n
. tup-Clio;-!*,

:• -A .. I •.•u'li vi jM'i; "
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\ i:»-.
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'a*, ei the 'active

participatioi. standard, a p:mcipal emplover is subject to -ubdih tm injuries arising out of its
H .CiJCiltJ.
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• • . ' ; , . . .

•

manner of performance of tlu \ ontiacled woi k " id at <il^ Bxamplesof such control o« eui ulu-n
the pr i nci pal en i pi oyer c 1 i reel s tl i at 11 ie con t r ac ted wo r k b e d on efay\ i se o f a certai n n i ocl c oi otliei \ < r i se
interferes with the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished." Id. (internal
c itatioi is on litted). 1 1 ie cca in t ultii i lately determh led that Jc; .ss had i lot activel) pai ticipated in the
manner or method of performance and, consequently, was not liable to rhompson.

Hie court

reasoned that u[a]fter agreeing to erect the pipe, Jensen, nol fess, detet i nine dthen ietl ic> if c: i bi ingii ig
about the desired result. ., . . "1 he only control Jess exerted was in directing that the pipe be installed
over the pipe sti lb I his an 101 inted n lei eiy to control ovei the desired resi ill " h / at f]24.
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The "retained control doctrine" has been clarified by subsequent cases. In Magana v. Roth
Construction, 2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143, the court stated, "the question of whether an employer
actively participated is not simply whether an employer participated in an injury-causing activity,
but whether the employer controlled the means and methods by which the injury-causing activity was
performed." Id. at ^31. The court went on to say, that, regardless of whether the contractor had
controlled some aspects of the subcontractor's work, the contractor had to "exert sufficient control
over the independent contractor such that [the contractor cannot] cany out the injury-causing aspect
of the work in its own way." Id. at ^|27 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Thus, the aspect
that the contractor controls must be the proximate cause of the injury. Id. The court also rejected
the plaintiffs argument that Campbell's general responsibility for safety at the site constituted
"active participation." The Magana court stated that "a general obligation to oversee safety on a
project does not equate to exerting control over the method and manner of the injury-causing aspect
of the [sub-contractor's] work." Id. at^|29 (citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
In Begaye v. Big D Construction Corp., 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343, the court determined that
when the contractor "controlled the sequence of the task, as well as the workflow generally, but it
had no discretion or control regarding the specifics of how [the wall] was built or which bracing
method was used," this was insufficient to prove retained control. Id. at ^[11. Additionally, although
the contractor ordered the subcontractor to build the wall "when it could have sent the employees
home for the day or sent them to work on another wall, such discretion is insufficient to bring it
within the scope of the 'active participation' standard." Id. at ^|12.
In the present case, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff
simply cannot show that Defendant "retained control" over the injury-causing activity. It is
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i indisputed that Defendant i icvei oi dei ed Cobble Creek tc : bi nld 1:1 le i vail in a cei tain inai iner.
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant should be held vicariously liable for the injury suffered
becai ssethe coi nbined effect of all of Defendant's actions (lea1* 'ing the trench open, placii igdii thills
in inconvenient places, requiring Cobble Creek to keep working or be replaced) effectively
controlled Plaii itiffs actions to tl le extent that Plaintiffs were forced to perfon n theii • oi: k ii i an
unsafe manner.

While these arguments may be presented under a direct negligence theory, as a

ii latter of la * the y :1c :ir: :>l establish that Defei idant actively participated ii I directing the ii lji ii ycausing aspect of the work The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' claim under the "retained
conti oi" theoi y fails.
3.

Causation

prove vvhal caused it
- ft ilv !>• ••
a tiv w-ul

: i.-i; .

1 his argument lacks merit. 1 hough Plamtiils may noi have evidence of
:.

. KII pa- 1 •' • •

J

;
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•- •>• i iJ<.->i ili* • :•

: here is no allegation that Chnstensen (a) jumped into the hole purposely. ;h)

"\Miiinp when hr tc|l, >i (t i <va ; pudinl

H-USU

\

I In I uii'l cont ItuCs Ikt 1 an lite hiel^ i ' flu1 ease,

Plaintiffs have sufficient evidence to take the causation issue to the fact-finder.
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